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Kulwinski: Trust in God Going Too Far: Indiana's "In God We Trust" License P

TRUST IN GOD GOING TOO FAR: INDIANA’S
“IN GOD WE TRUST” LICENSE PLATE
ENDORSES RELIGION AT TAXPAYER
EXPENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
On a September morning in 1814, as the smoke settled from a battle
the night before, the sun rose in the eastern sky, and the morning dew
began to dissipate, Frances Scott Key, inspired by a flag that remained
flying through the night, wrote what would become the United States
National Anthem.1 The fourth stanza, in particular, is often claimed to
herald for the first time what would develop into the phrase “In God We
Trust.”2 It states in part,
Blest with vict’ry & peace may the heav’n-rescued land
Praise the Power that hath made & preserv’d us a nation!
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just.
And this be our motto—“In God is our Trust[.]”3
“In God We Trust” did not resurface on the national scene until 1864
when it appeared on United States currency.4 After World War II and
1
The Star Spangled Banner, http://americanhistory.si.edu/ssb/6_thestory/6b_osay/
fs6b.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007) (citing Stanza four of the poem written by Francis
Scott Key after he witnessed an 1814 battle at Fort McHenry and saw the American flag
flying the next morning amidst all of the smoke from the battle). See OSCAR GEORGE
THEODORE SONNECK, REPORT ON “STAR-SPANGLED BANNER” “HAIL COLUMBIA” “AMERICA”
“YANKEE DOODLE” 7–42 (Dover Publ’n, Inc. 1972) (providing an interesting insight on the
Star Spangled Banner).
2
Encyclopedia Smithsonian:
Star-Spangled Banner and the War of 1812,
http://www.si.edu/Encyclopedia_SI/nmah/starflag.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). The
Star Spangled Banner was not officially adopted as the national anthem of the United States
until 1931 when President Herbert Hoover signed it into law. Id.
3
SONNECK, supra note 1, at 37.
4
ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 311 (6th Cir. 2001)
(noting that one reason “In God We Trust” was placed on the national currency was the
religious fervor during the Civil War). See generally Willard B. Gatewood, Theodore
Roosevelt and the Coinage Controversy, 18 AM. Q. 35, 45 (1966), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2711109 (discussing the history of Theodore Roosevelt’s
crusade to redesign the currency because he felt it was sacrilegious to place a Deity on a
coin, and also discussing the great backlash President Roosevelt received as a result of
maintaining his position that the phrase “In God We Trust” should be removed from the
national currency). See also U.S. Treasury—Fact Sheet on the History of “In God We Trust,”
http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-sheets/currency/in-god-we-trust.shtml
(last
visited Sept. 23, 2007). The idea of placing “In God We Trust” on the currency first passed
into legislation by an Act of Congress on April 22, 1864, authorizing the phrase to appear
on the two-cent coin. Id. The Secretary of the Treasury received numerous letters from
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the increased threats of Communism and its non-religious practices,
Congress adopted “In God We Trust” as the national motto.5 References
to God in the public sphere have become increasingly common; for
example, Indiana’s General Assembly designed Indiana license plates

religiously devout peoples urging the United States to recognize God on United States
coinage. Id. The United States Treasury website posted an excerpt from one of the letters
written by a minister from Pennsylvania which stated in part,
Dear Sir: You are about to submit your annual report to the
Congress respecting the affairs of the national finances.
One fact touching our currency has hitherto been seriously
overlooked. I mean the recognition of the Almighty God in some form
on our coins.
You are probably a Christian. What if our Republic were not
shattered beyond reconstruction? Would not the antiquaries of
succeeding centuries rightly reason from our past that we were a
heathen nation? What I propose is that instead of the goddess of
liberty we shall have next inside the 13 stars a ring inscribed with the
words PERPETUAL UNION; within the ring the allseeing eye,
crowned with a halo; beneath this eye the American flag, bearing in its
field stars equal to the number of the States united; in the folds of the
bars the words GOD, LIBERTY, LAW.
This would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible citizen
could object. This would relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism.
This would place us openly under the Divine protection we have
personally claimed. From my hearth I have felt our national shame in
disowning God as not the least of our present national disasters.
To you first I address a subject that must be agitated.
Id. Since the phrase “In God We Trust” was first placed on the two-cent coin in 1864,
Congress eventually placed it on the rest of the nation’s coinage and other forms of paper
currency over the years. Id.
5
See generally Proclamation No. 8038, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,343 (Aug. 1, 2006). See also The
White House Website: 50th Anniversary of Our National Motto, “In God We Trust,” 2006,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-12.html (last visited Sept.
23, 2007) (referencing President Bush’s Proclamation celebrating the 50th anniversary of “In
God We Trust” as the national motto that was originally signed into law by President
Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956). See, e.g., ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory
Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 721 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d en banc, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001). Courts that
have addressed the issue surrounding the constitutionality of the motto have upheld it
claiming that “In God We Trust” has little or nothing to do with government endorsement
of religion. Id. at 721. Other such public references to God appeared on the national scene
during the 1940s and 1950s amidst the height of the Cold War. Id. at 722 (describing the
official adoption of the Pledge of Allegiance in 1942 and the words “one nation under God”
being inserted in 1954). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that there were strong
religious reasons for inserting the references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance and
adopting “In God We Trust” as the national motto, and that these decisions were heavily
influenced by the threat from abroad and the strong conflicting views on human morality
that the United States and the Soviet Union held. Id. See also ACLU of Ohio, 243 F.3d at 301
(pointing out that the phrase “In God We Trust” has also been displayed on government
buildings and even above the chair where the Speaker of the House of Representatives sits
while Congress is in session).
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bearing the phrase “In God We Trust[,]” and these plates are available to
Indiana citizens for the same cost as regular license plates.6
Specialty license plates are nothing new on America’s roadways.7 In
fact, specialty license plate programs are a great source of revenue for the
sponsoring organization, while they cost the state and its taxpayers little
or nothing at all.8 Whereas many specialty license plates simply promote
local sports teams or universities, other plates have proved to be more
controversial.9 One instructive example is the “Choose Life” license
plate sponsored by various pro-life groups.10 Indiana’s “In God We

6
IND. CODE § 9-18-24.5-1-5 (2006) (covering the availability of the “In God We Trust”
license plate, its design, and the applicable fee); see also H.R. 1013, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006). See Editorial, ‘In God We Trust’ is Costly Specialty Plate, MERRILLVILLE
POST-TRIBUNE, Apr. 1, 2007, at A12 (discussing that the fee for funding this license plate is
borne by all citizens of Indiana whether they have the plate or not because the fee is drawn
from the state highway fund). The article alleges that the state has spent $3.89 per plate
and over one million dollars total to produce the “In God We Trust” license plates. Id.;
Editorial, Furthermore, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Apr. 11, 2007, at 12A (noting that one in
four drivers has the “In God We Trust” plate and that money from the state’s Motor
Vehicles Highway Account has covered the cost of these plates totaling more than 1.5
million dollars thus far at $3.69 per plate).
7
Andy G. Olree, Specialty License Plates: Look Who’s Talking in the Sixth Circuit, 68 ALA.
LAWYER 212 (2007). Although the days of clever alphanumeric combinations to display a
message by motorists are not over, states since about the 1980s have taken messages on
license plates even further by offering specialty plate programs. Id. See Michael W.
Hoskins, Fees Drive License Plate Legal Challenge, 18-5 IND. LAWYER 1, 25 (2007). Specialty
plates allow motorists to express their love for their local university, the environment, or
any other number of interests on a license plate that is usually distinctive in look with a
special design different from the traditional state plate. Id. See also Olree, supra, at 213
(Some states have twenty to thirty different specialized plates from which to choose, while
other states have as many as 500 choices); Traci Daffer, Note, A License to Choose or a Plateful of Controversy? Analysis of the “Choose Life” Plate Debate, 75 UMKC L. REV. 869, 869–70
(2007) (explaining that as of June 2006 there were over 84,371 different specialty license
plates available for motorists across the country, and in June 2003, forty-one states had
specialty plate programs available).
8
Daffer, supra note 7, at 870 n.8 (demonstrating that as of early 2007, specialty plate
programs raised 41.2 million dollars for space-related programs in Florida). See also ACLU
of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the “Choose Life” message
on license plates constituted government speech, and the license plates were constitutional
because Tennessee controlled the message and approved the words used on the plate). But
see Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that “Choose
Life” specialty plates were a mix of both government and private speech and were thus
unconstitutional on the basis of viewpoint discrimination).
9
See infra notes 10–11.
10
See generally Daffer, supra note 7 (exploring the controversy regarding the “Choose
Life” plate debate and the various litigation that has arisen). Daffer discussed the existing
case law surrounding this issue and the circuit split as to whether the “Choose Life” plate
should be classified as government or private speech. Id. See also Sarah E. Hurst, A One
Way Street to Unconstitutionality: The ‘Choose Life’ Specialty License Plate, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 957
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Trust” license plate, which prominently displays the motto “In God We
Trust[,]” has also spawned much debate among supporters and critics.11
For example, the Indiana American Civil Liberties Union challenged this
license plate as violating the Indiana Constitution’s privileges and
immunities clause, but importantly for this Note, did not allege a First
Amendment violation.12 This lawsuit has since been dismissed on
summary judgment in favor of the state.13 Yet, Indiana is not alone in
(2003) (discussing that the “Choose Life” plates in various states should be held
unconstitutional, in part for violating the Establishment Clause).
11
See P.J. Huffstutter, A Fight to Put the Brakes on a License Plate Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2007, at 14 (discussing the controversy surrounding Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license
plates and the pending litigation by the Indiana ACLU).
12
Hoskins, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining that the basis for the litigation is not about
religion but about fairness). The lawsuit was initiated on behalf of an Allen County
resident and filed in Marion Superior Court on Apr. 23, 2007. Id. This resident purchased
an environmental plate, which carries a fee of forty dollars, part of which is an
administrative fee to produce the plate and the rest of which is designated to the respective
organization in support of its cause. Id. The resident contended that the “In God We
Trust” plate carried a message and in fact was promoted by the Indiana Bureau of Motor
Vehicles (“BMV”) as a “no fee” specialty plate, but unlike other specialty license plates that
promote a cause or message, the “In God We Trust” plate did not require an administrative
fee to cover the cost of production. Id.; see also Ken Kusmer, BMV Faces Lawsuit Over ‘In
God We Trust’ Plates, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Apr. 24, 2007, at B6 (explaining the basis
for the lawsuit filed by the Indiana Civil Liberties Union). See Indiana Bureau of Motor
Vehicles: Indiana’s License Plates, http://www.in.gov/bmv/3999.htm (last visited Sept.
22, 2007) (describing the plate as a “no-fee” specialty plate). But see Indiana Bureau of
Motor Vehicles: Indiana’s License Plates, http://www.in.gov.bmv.platesandtitles/plates
(last visited Oct. 26, 2007) (describing the “In God We Trust” license plate as the “state’s
first alternative regular plate”). According to the Bureau’s website, “This year, the Indiana
Bureau of Motor Vehicles is offering 12 new license plates, including the state’s new ‘nofee’ specialty plate featuring an ‘In God We Trust’ design, and a new ‘Support Our Troops’
military plate.” Id. Furthermore, the website mentions that those “who purchase special
recognition license plates” shall pay certain fees listed, including group fees, administrative
fees of which the “In God We Trust” plate is exempt, and registration charges. Id. The
“Support Our Troops” plate appears not to require an administrative fee either, although it
does require a twenty-dollar group fee that supports the “Military Family Relief Fund.” Id.
Thus, the classification of the “In God We Trust” plate as a specialty plate was not entirely
clear because there were mixed statements regarding its status. See generally IND. CONST.
art. I, § 23 (stating the Equal Privileges clause of the Indiana Constitution “shall not grant to
any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall
not equally belong to all citizens[]”).
13
See Niki Kelly, Judge Throws Out “In God” Tags Suit, Lack of Fee Challenged Appeal Likely,
FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 18, 2008, at 1C (noting that a Marion County Judge granted
summary judgment in favor of the State of Indiana in the litigation brought by the ACLU
challenging Indiana’s new “In God We Trust” plates). Ken Falk, attorney for the ACLU,
said that “[w]e weren’t challenging the message of ‘In God We Trust,’ just that any other
message plate has a cost to it[.] . . . ” Id. Furthermore, the trial court agreed with the state
in finding that the plate is a regular plate, and not a specialty plate. Id. See also Court Sides
with BMV on ‘God,’ License Plate Fees Ruled this Decision Should Be Left to General Assembly,
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Apr. 18, 2008, at B7 (quoting Judge Gary L. Miller, who
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referencing God on its license plates. Nearly a dozen other state license
plates display “In God We Trust” or “God Bless America[,]” but unlike
Indiana’s plates, most of them have been issued as specialty plates,
which means that a driver who wants one must pay an additional fee for
it.14
decided the case, “Courts are not to second-guess the Indiana General Assembly when it
comes to calculations of this sort[.] . . . ”).
14
The following states charge a fee for the plate and clearly label it as a specialty plate
on their motor vehicles website: Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas. See Arkansas (specialty license plate bears the
phrase “In God We Trust”), available at http://www.arkansas.gov/dfa/motor_vehicle/
mv_plates_detail.php?pl_id=87; Iowa (specialty license plate bearing the phrase “God Bless
America”), available at http://www.dot.state.ia.us/mvd/ovs/plates/bless.htm; Louisiana
(specialty license plate bears the phrase “In God We Trust”), available at http://omv.dps.
state.la.us/Special%20Plates/SpecialPlates_display.asp (Select “In God We Trust” plate);
Missouri (specialty license plate displaying the phrase “God Bless America with a
depiction of the Statute of Liberty”), available at http://dor.mo.gov/mvdl/motorv/plates/
(under “choose a design category and organization,” click on the drop down box and select
“organizational,” then choose “God Bless America” and enter any text into box below and
hit “submit”); Mississippi (specialty license plate bearing the phrase “God Bless America”),
available at http://www.mstc.state.ms.us/mvl/tag_img/Godbles.jpg; North Carolina
(specialty license plate containing the phrase “In God We Trust” with a “Support our
Troops” ribbon displayed on the plate as well), available at https://edmvsp.dot.state.nc.us/sp/SpecialPlatesPortal.html (click on “special plate viewers,” select
“special interest plate,” and select “In God We Trust”); Ohio (specialty license plate bearing
the phrase “One Nation Under God”), available at https://www.oplates.com/Name
Lookup/PlateLookupWizard1.asp?ID=LCBUWDAFIEMTDTZKQHZBEUSBDYRFXMJWT
DNJMQBWGUHRSPNOLK (select “Passenger Car,” click “submit,” then select “One
Nation Under God” and click “View this plate”); Tennessee (specialty license plate
exhibiting the phrase “In God We Trust” with an image of a Bald Eagle on the plate as
well), available at http://www.tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/licenseplates/misc/
miscdesc.htm#eagle; Texas (specialty license plate displaying the phrase “God Bless
America” along with a picture of a Bald Eagle), available at http://rts.texasonline.state.tx.
us/NASApp/txdotrts/SpecialPlateOrderServlet?grpid=60&pltid=84?nbr=121&type=OT.
Alabama and South Carolina offer specialty plates that display the phrase “God Bless
America” or “In God We Trust” as well, but these states, like Indiana, do not charge a fee.
See Alabama (specialty license plate bearing the phrase “God Bless America”), available at
http://www.revenue.alabama.gov/motorvehicle/specialty.html, and South Carolina
(specialty license plate displaying the phrase “In God We Trust”), available at
http://www.scdmvonline.com/DMVNew/PlateGallery.aspx?q=Specialty. See also Jessica
Gresko, Florida Debates License Plates, State Would Be First in Nation to Offer Specialty Plates for
Christians, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Apr. 24, 2008, at 3A (discussing the Florida
Legislature’s consideration of creating an “I Believe” specialty plate to promote Christian
beliefs). The design would contain a Christian Cross, stained glass window, and the words
“I Believe.” Id. If created, Florida’s plates would require a fee in addition to the regular
administrative fee because of its status as a specialty plate. Id. Indiana’s “In God We
Trust” plate does not require an extra fee costing the same as the standard issue plate. Id.
At this point the author of this Note is not aware of any litigation regarding the
constitutionality of the “I Believe” plate or the Florida legislature’s ability to create such a
license plate.
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Irrespective of those dozen or so states, this Note contends that
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate raises serious Establishment
Clause and speech subsidy concerns because of the improper religious
motivation behind the creation of the license plate and the State’s failure
to charge a fee for those who want to display the “In God We Trust”
message.15 This Note explores the tangled web of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and its convergence with the expanding breadth of
government speech relating to compelled subsidies. In doing so, this
Note exposes the constitutional problems posed by Indiana’s “In God
We Trust” license plate. To this end, Part II explores the history and
development of the United States Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
decisions, along with the free speech and freedom of association
problems that arise when the government compels citizens to pay for a
message promulgated by the government.16 Part III applies current
Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy tests to Indiana’s license
plates, demonstrating the deficiencies in the current doctrines to
adequately address the “In God We Trust” message on the license
plates.17 Part IV suggests that the “In God We Trust” license plate
should be found unconstitutional because the Indiana General Assembly
attempted to mask its religious purpose and is now compelling its
citizens to subsidize a private message.18
Accordingly, this Note proposes that courts should use Justice
Breyer’s six interpretative tools—text, history, tradition, precedent,
15
Hoskins, supra note 7, at 1. See generally Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
240 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Capturing the reflective nature of the more current
American “melting pot” society that was not present upon our nation’s founding, Justice
Brennan noted:
[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people
than were our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among
Protestant sects. Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous
religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of
Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship according to no
version of the Bible and those who worship no God at all.
Id.
16
See infra Part II (discussing the various tests used by courts when reviewing the
constitutionality of governmental displays containing religious symbols and the analysis
adopted by courts when determining whether a governmentally compelled subsidy is
occurring).
17
See infra Part III (suggesting that Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate violates
the Establishment Clause because the legislator who created the plate had an improper
purpose, essentially endorsing religion, and also because by not charging a fee to cover the
cost of production of the license plate, Indiana compels its citizens who disagree with the
religious message to pay for the plate so that other citizens can display the message).
18
See infra Part IV. See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1224–25 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that the departure of Justice O’Connor from the
composition of the Court would likely affect future Establishment Clause determinations).
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purpose, and consequences—when analyzing the Indiana’s “In God We
Trust” license plate and other Establishment Clause cases.19
Additionally, courts, especially when dealing with license plates, should
adopt the following four-factor test when analyzing a compelled subsidy
speech issue: (1) determine the purpose behind the license plate; (2)
determine who maintains editorial control of the message on the plate;
(3) determine who is identified as the actual speaker of this message—
government or private actor; and (4) determine who is held accountable
for the speech.20 Moreover, this Note advises future legislators, who are
considering similar license plates, to demonstrate a clear secular purpose
and to classify the plates as specialty license plates that require
individual owners to pay an additional fee.21
II. BACKGROUND
Part II presents a brief history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and surveys the legal backdrop of compelled subsidies doctrine relating
to government speech.22 Part II.A focuses on the tests used to determine
when religious displays by the government are constitutional under the
Establishment Clause, as well as the possible underlying coercive and
psychological effects of government messages.23 Part II.B discusses the
two main approaches to the compelled speech doctrine and conflicting
appellate court tests used to determine who is speaking.24
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
A key concern surrounding the “In God We Trust” license plate is
the possible violation of the Establishment Clause.25 Although the

19
See infra Part IV; see also Dahila Lithwick, Scalia and Breyer Sell Very Different
Constitutional Worldviews, SLATE, Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2154993/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2008).
20
See infra notes 126–32 (adopting the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals four-part test as
used in Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc v. Rose).
21
See infra Part V.
22
See infra Parts II.A–B.
23
See infra Part II.A.
24
See infra Part II.B.
25
See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 712 (6th Cir.
2000), rev’d en banc, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting the very fine factual distinctions
often drawn in Establishment Clause cases). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1182
(discussing the effects of the incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which was first
recognized by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)). However,
according to Justice Thomas, the Establishment Clause should not be applied to the states
because it was written only to prevent the national government from establishing a
religion. Id. Adoption of Justice Thomas’s view would drastically reshape the confines of
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Founding Fathers likely expressed religious sentiments, they vehemently
expressed competing views about the meaning of the Establishment
Clause.26 To this day, religion has continued to play an integral role in
the power delegated to states and local municipalities and essentially provide free reign to
those entities to advance or inhibit religion in whatever context they saw fit. Id.
26
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632–36 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the
history and traditions of religion in this country, particularly the use of prayer in the public
sector). Other examples demonstrating an entanglement between the state and religion
include references to a higher being within the Declaration of Independence, the common
use of Bibles for swearing in public officials, and references by Presidents to God in their
inaugural addresses. Id. at 633–34; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–90 (2005)
(offering more visually apparent references to the tradition of using religious symbols in
American society). See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 247 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2005)
(“Madison himself understood that paying the chaplains of the House and Senate out of
public funds was a constitutional anomaly, and he wisely suggested that the Congress
ought to pay for their services from their own pockets.”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977) (quoting Madison and Jefferson regarding the dangers of
government forcing a person to monetarily contribute to support any establishment, and
noting that Jefferson stated that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical[]”). But see Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983) (“Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment
Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation
of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without
interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”). See also DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER,
THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 4 (The Oryx Press 1994) (citation omitted). Despite
the entanglement of religion with the nation’s early history, many of the founders strongly
advocated a separation between the state and religion. Id. In summation, one of the more
famous statements capturing the essence of separation of church and state was made by
Thomas Jefferson,
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or
his worship; that legislative powers of the government reach actions
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act
of the whole American people which declared that their legislature
should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of
separation between church and State.
Id. See generally Deborah Jones Merritt & Daniel C. Merritt, The Future of Religious
Pluralism: Justice O’Connor and the Establishment Clause, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 895 (2007), for an
interesting discussion of the development of the religion clauses and the influence that
religion has played in the nation’s founding. The Merritt article documents the colonial
period and the established religions that were held in some of the colonies. Id. at 898–904.
The article provides statistical analysis concerning how Americans felt toward religions in
general and the passions and violence that such feelings created. Id. at 918–29. In fact, one
study detailed the power of the Evangelical Christian voting bloc in the 2000 presidential
election that proposed a theory of “religious threat” as one motivational tool for the group
to turn out in high numbers to vote. Id. at 929–30. See generally MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL,
JOHN H. GARVEY, AND THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1–100 (Aspen
Law & Business 2002) (discussing the history of the Establishment Clause and the religious
tension that has existed in the country even prior to its founding); CHEMERINSKY, supra note
18, at 1184–85 (discussing that the Founding Fathers held three main points of views, which
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the nation’s development.27 Over time, three views have emerged for
interpreting the Establishment Clause—strict separation, neutrality, and
accommodation.28 The current religious and political climate in the
have shaped both the courts’ and society’s current understanding of the Establishment
Clause and its meaning). Chemerinsky cited to Professor Laurence Tribe who noted that
there was the “evangelical view[,]” associated with Roger Williams, which sought to
protect religion from the worldly corruptions of the state. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at
1184. There was also the view held by Jefferson who wanted to insulate the government
and secular institutions from the ecclesiastical incursions (building a wall of separation),
and the view of Madison, which sought to decentralize the power between the state and
religion to promote the healthy competition of ideas, both secular and religious, so that no
one sect was favored over another. Id.
27
School Dist. Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237–38 (1963). Justice Brennan
highlighted the dangers of using history as a guiding principle when seeking the true
meaning of the Establishment Clause:
A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the
issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for several
reasons[.] . . . [T]he historical record is at best ambiguous, and
statements can readily be found to support either side of the
proposition. The ambiguity of history is understandable if we recall
the nature of the problems uppermost in the thinking of the statesmen
who fashioned the religious guarantees; they were concerned with far
more flagrant intrusions of government into the realm of religion than
any that our century has witnessed. While it is clear to me that the
Framers meant the Establishment Clause to prohibit more than the
creation of an established federal church[,] . . . they gave no distinct
consideration to the particular question whether the clause also
forbade devotional exercises in public institutions.
Id. (footnote omitted). See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 26, at 199–200 (noting that since the
Marsh v. Chambers decision, there has been a rising of values-based evangelicalism,
beginning with the Christian Conservative movement in 1984 to ensure control over the
changing Supreme Court). See generally CNN website, New Huckabee ad appeals to
Christian
conservatives,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/01/01/huckabee.
christians/index.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2008) (reflecting this trend in the 2008 Presidential
Primary campaigns, which included discussions about faith and values, the Christian
Coalition voting bloc, and accusations of political advertisements containing “Christian”
messages and symbolism); MSNBC website, Huckabee stands by ‘Christ’ comment,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22443302/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (same); MSNBC
website, Romney: No religious test for president, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
22129738/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) (stressing his religious beliefs and his support for
religion in the public sphere in an attempt to qualm some voters anxieties concerning his
Mormon faith).
28
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1192–98 (discussing more broadly the three
approaches used by the Court in approaching Establishment Clause jurisprudence). Strict
interpretation is often most aligned with Jefferson’s wall of separation, and any violation of
this principle imposes a coercive effect on the citizens to comply either explicitly or
implicitly with the consequence of feeling like an outsider for noncompliance. Id. at 1192.
Neutrality theory is best exemplified by the view of Justice O’Connor who articulated that
the Court should look to the “reasonable observer” in determining the effects of the law.
Id. at 1193–96. Although this approach is often criticized as ambiguous and difficult to
apply, a majority of the Court, at least as it was comprised a few years ago, seems to have
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United States embodies these diverging views—a climate which many
people believe has contributed to the polarization of the nation.29
Indeed, recent litigation in Indiana clearly reflects this religious strife.30
adopted this approach, which seeks to minimize the concern of making people potentially
feel like outsiders. Id. at 1196. The other approach used by the Court is the
accommodation theory, which is by far the most expansive literal approach to the
Establishment Clause. Id. Essentially, under the accommodation theory, the government
would violate the Establishment Clause only if it were to literally establish a house of
worship. Id. This interpretation more closely resembles Justices Kennedy’s and Scalia’s
coercion theory, mandating equal treatment of both religious and non-religious groups. Id.
at 1196–97.
29
STEVEN P. BROWN, TRUMPING RELIGION: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE SPEECH
CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS 1 (Univ. of Ala. Press 2002) (highlighting the new political
agenda by the Christian right to “reclaim America”). A convention that was held in Fort
Lauderdale in 1996 offered a series of workshops to help train concerned Christians on
how to put their faith into action in the public arena. Id. At the conclusion of the
conference, the following sentiments were offered:
For more than thirty years, America has undergone a sustained and
wide-ranging attack on the godly foundation which made our nation a
well-ordered bastion of liberty, peace, and prosperity. That attack is
finally meeting resistance. More and more Christians are awakening
to their duty to defend faith and freedom in an increasingly hostile,
secular society. Now more than ever, they have discovered the need to
reclaim America.
Id.; see also Debra Lemoine, Judge Gets Arguments on School Board Meeting Prayers, BATON
ROUGE ADVOCATE, Sept. 10, 2004, at 1 (explaining how a local group of conservative
Christians were able to organize and form a Community Network that was able to
successfully get a minister appointed to the local school board to help advance the group’s
agendas). See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
489, 515–16 (2006) (noting that the Rehnquist Court signaled a change in how the religion
clauses should be interpreted, and this change continued throughout President George W.
Bush’s presidency). The authors elaborated,
There has been a distinct and genuine move from the Warren and early
Burger Court’s general hostility to government support of religion to a
new theory of “neutrality” . . . . The Court now places relatively few
barriers in the way of state or federal funds going to religious schools
or other religious organizations so long as the purpose is not a naked
preference for religious versus secular organizations. Some advocates
believed—some with horror, some with joy—that this portended a full
180 degree turn, in which the Supreme Court would define
“neutrality” as requiring support for religious education so long as
nonreligious education received support. . . .
[I]t is impossible to estimate the shelf life of the Court’s twin—and
many would say incoherent—decisions in McCreary County v. ACLU
and Van Orden v. Perry regarding government-supported displays of
religion in the public square. In these two cases, the Court struck
down a publicly supported display of the Ten Commandments in
Kentucky, but upheld one in Texas. Justice Kennedy was in dissent in
McCreary County, and in the plurality in Van Orden. Given that he is
the new swing Justice, this means that Van Orden, which gave local
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Recently in Hinrichs v. Bosma,31 four Indiana taxpayers alleged that
prayers used to open legislative sessions in the Indiana General
Assembly were sectarian in nature and highly favorable of the Christian
faith.32 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the preliminary
governments far greater leeway to place religious iconography in
public places, probably represents the wave of the future. One can
nevertheless imagine a wide range of different possible directions for
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise doctrine, depending on
remaining opportunities for President Bush to make appointments
before his term expires in January 2009, the results of the 2006 elections
(which might shift control of the Senate or weaken the Republican
majority there), and, perhaps most importantly, the winner of the 2008
presidential election. It is worth noting, however, that a Democratic
appointment replacing Justice Stevens in 2009 would likely preserve
the current status quo that features Kennedy as the swing Justice,
while replacing Stevens with a strong conservative would have a much
more significant impact on the jurisprudence of the religion clauses[]
....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See generally Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2007) (displaying
information regarding the Office of Faith Based Initiatives, an office President Bush
created, and claiming that the office’s mission is “Compassion in Action”); Posting Jay
Sekulow, In God We Trust - Protecting Our National Motto, American Center for Law &
Justice (Apr. 2006), http://www.aclj.org/News/Read.aspx?ID=2201 (last visited Feb. 7,
2009) (describing the importance of the national motto and the commitment by the
American Center for Law & Justice to defend the religious heritage of the United States of
America). But see Posting Erwin Chemerinsky, Time to Fight the Religious Right to THE
HUFFINGTON POST http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erwin-chemerinsky/time-to-fightthe-religio_b_8048.html?view=screen (Sept. 28, 2005, 21:48 EST) (discussing that the
greatest threat to the nation’s freedom comes from the religious right and that efforts
should be put in place to counter their influence). See generally Mark Stricherz, Primary
Colors: How a Little-Known Task Force Helped Create Red State / Blue State America, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2003, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/
2003/11/23/primary_colors/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2007) (pointing out the sharp political
divisions in the country by concluding that in the sixteen years of the study, there has
never been a wider gap between red and blue states).
30
Eddie Baeb, Indiana’s Christians to Fight Ruling, BUFFALO NEWS (New York), Dec. 15,
2005, at A9 (referencing a study from Indiana University that claimed roughly 82% of
Hoosiers identified themselves as Christian while less than one percent identified as Jewish
or Muslim). See generally ‘In God We Trust’ is Costly Specialty Plate, supra note 6, at A12
(acknowledging that Indiana is a conservative state, and noting that its choice to offer its
citizens a license plate that references God is not surprising).
31
440 F.3d 393, 403 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d, Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Rep. of Ind.
Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007). See Anne Abrell, Note, Just a Little Talk with
Jesus: Reaching the Limits of the Legislative Prayer Exception, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 145 (2007), for
an in-depth analysis of the Hinrichs case and legislative prayer.
32
Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at 395–97. Hinrichs contained many examples of legislative prayers
consisting of direct references to Jesus Christ that were often sectarian and focused on the
Christian faith. Id. at 395–96. In fact, one of the legislative sessions opened up with a song
titled, “Just a Little Talk with Jesus.” Id. at 395. See also Posting of Don Byrd to Blog from
the Capital, http://www.bjconline.org/cgi-bin/2007/11/7th_circuits_bosma_reversal_sh.
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injunction ordered by the lower court to preclude these prayers, and
held that the prayers likely violated the Establishment Clause.33 After
the court upheld the injunction, the Indiana General Assembly reinstituted legislative prayers, making sure that these prayers were nonsectarian in nature.34 Representative Woody Burton, who authored the
legislation for the “In God We Trust” license plates, responded to this reinstitution of prayer in the Indiana General Assembly by saying that he
was “tickled to death” that prayer was again permitted in the House
html (November 1, 2007 19:37) (discussing the effect of the Hein decision on taxpayer
standing challenges and in view of Establishment Clause concerns). A Jewish lobbyist
group traveled to Indianapolis to lobby state senators and representatives and had an
exchange with Speaker Bosma regarding Hinrichs, which was in litigation at the time, and
afterward, one lobbyist, Mr. Don Byrd, had the following comments:
Speaker Bosma wondered why we hadn’t discussed the controversy
surrounding the issue of prayer in House chambers. He told us his
version of what happened and what he believes, and a passionate
exchange took place. The end of this exchange left us, the Jewish
delegation, in shock. Speaker Bosma, defending the prayer issue,
asked, “How many Jews are there in Indiana? About 2%? There are at
least 80% Christians in Indiana.”
Id. Mr. Byrd, a Rabbi with the Jewish delegation, felt that Speaker Bosma’s statement
provided insight into some of the sentiments that reside within the General Assembly and
the perceived majority rule attitude. Id. Mr. Byrd worried that these sentiments are
increasingly common as a result of the Court’s recent Establishment Clause and taxpayer
standing jurisprudence. Id.
33
Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at 402–03 (holding that a court-ordered stay, which would permit
the sectarian prayers to continue, was not warranted because Speaker Bosma failed to meet
his burden of showing that the opposing parties did not have standing and that the
Establishment Clause was not violated). But see Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Rep. of
Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that Indiana taxpayers did not
have standing to challenge the alleged violation of the Establishment Clause concerning the
General Assembly’s prayer session and its sectarian overtones). The Seventh Circuit
reversed its earlier decision based on the Court’s recent decision in Hein v. Religious Freedom
Foundation, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). Id. at 590. Although the Seventh Circuit noted that,
a pecuniary interest is not the only means of establishing standing. . . .
In the context of an alleged Establishment Clause violation, we have
stated that “allegations of direct and unwelcome exposure to a
religious message” are sufficient to show the injury-in-fact necessary to
support standing.
Id. at 590 n.5 (citation omitted). The Hinrichs court noted the factual importance of the
plaintiffs dropping their alternative reason for standing, which was that Mr. Hinrichs was
no longer personally affected by the sectarian prayers because he was no longer going to be
engaged as a lobbyist at the statehouse. Id. Therefore, the only alleged basis for standing
was the basis of taxpayer standing, which was denied in light of Hein. Id. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit gave a detailed analysis of the Hein decision and its effect
on Establishment Clause challenges under taxpayer standing. Id. at 590–600. The court
noted that past Supreme Court decisions held that the same standing requirements for
federal taxpayers applied to state taxpayers as well. Id. at 592, 596 n.6.
34
Indiana House Opens with a Hope and a Prayer, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Jan. 9,
2007, at A1.
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because it is a long tradition that should be continued.35 Burton’s
legislative record also contains a history of supporting legislation that
contains religious overtones, such as a ban on gay marriage.36
Representative Burton has tried to downplay the religious message
affiliated with the “In God We Trust” license plates, but some of his
statements can be interpreted to reveal religious motives.37 For example,
on the one hand, Burton stated that he hoped that the new license plates
“would be embraced by ‘both patriots and those of faith.’”38 On the
35
See id. (referencing the litigation that was appealed to the Seventh Circuit regarding
non-sectarian legislative prayer conducted during Indiana’s legislative session).
36
See Steve Walsh, ‘In God We Trust’ Makes Statement, MERRILLVILLE POST-TRIBUNE, Mar.
21, 2007, at A3. See Burton: Private, Not State, Funds Gay Center, FORT WAYNE NEWS
SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 1994, at 8A. Representative Burton has also been outspoken in the
Indiana legislature on some other topics that are controversial. Id. Burton opposed public
funding for an office at Indiana University that would benefit gay and lesbian students,
and he was one of the most vocal critics. Id. Instead, he urged the students and university
to seek private funding, even though the student government, faculty leaders, and board of
trustees had already expressed their approval for the public funds to be used for the office.
Id. Burton posited what seems to be an apparent contradiction because the “In God We
Trust” license plates that he helped create use public funding:
Failure to stop funding for the GLB [Gay, Lesbian, Bi-Sexual] office
will encourage cultural centers for other minority groups, such as “fat
people, skinny people, Nazis, pro-choice people and pro-life
groups”. . .“[s]hould we spend $50,000 for each of those special interest
groups[]”. . . .“[i]t is my opinion that this is where we draw the line.”
Id. Burton planned to propose an amendment that would cut five-hundred thousand
dollars from the university’s budget if the university decided to fund the center. Id.
37
See Niki Kelly, BMV Unveils “God” Plate for ‘O7, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 11,
2006, at 8C (discussing the availability of the newly designed license plate offered in early
2007 to Indiana residents at no extra charge). “Seeing the ‘In God We Trust’ license plate
come to life is a momentous occasion for everyone involved[.]” Id. (quoting Representative
Woody Burton, a Republican lawmaker from Greenwood, Indiana). “It is my hope that
thousands of Hoosiers will choose this plate and display it proudly.” Id. (quoting Mr.
Burton); Deanna Martin, In God We Trust License Plate Clears Senate Committee, AP ALERT,
Feb. 8, 2006, available at WL APALERTPOLITICS 20:29:16 (quoting Representative Burton
as having stated that the “In God We Trust” license plates concerned our nation’s heritage
and promoted “an important motto from American history[]”); see also Associated Press,
Plates Put Trust in God, MERRILLVILLE POST-TRIBUNE, Jan. 7, 2006, at A9 (quoting
Representative Burton as stating, “What I want is exactly what it says on the dollar
bill[.] . . . Nothing more[]”) (quotations omitted). On the other hand, some statements by
Representative Burton seem to relay his implicit promotion for religion, even if a
monotheistic one. See State Puts ‘Trust’ in New Plates, EVANSVILLE COURIER, Jan. 21, 2007, at
B1 (quoting Representative Burton, “I’m a faith-based person, anyways, [sic] and there had
been so much attack on religion throughout this country[]”). See generally Plates Put Trust
in God, supra, at A9 (referencing that for the second consecutive year, Representative Burton
advocated for legislation to support “In God We Trust” license plates). Burton has made it
a point at times to mention that the license plates are not specifying any one god. Id.
38
Huffstutter, supra note 11, at 14. See Woody Burton—He Listens. He Cares. He Takes
Action., http://www.woodyburton.com/ (last visited on Oct. 13, 2007) (providing a link to
Representative Burton’s legislative website containing various photographs depicting his
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other hand, some of his statements, such as, “I’m a Christian, but I don’t
care if you’re Christian or Jewish or Muslim []. . . . Your god may not be
my god, but this is still a country that’s based on faith. Why can’t you
tout that on your license plate?”, reveal a faith-based motivation.39
Burton’s reasons for introducing the “In God We Trust” license plates
are relevant to the Establishment Clause discussion because his personal
incentives shed light on the purpose of the license plates.40 To illustrate
the intricate nature of the Establishment Clause, Part II.A.1 discusses
cases involving governmental displays of religious symbols.41
1.

Making “Lemon”ade from Lemons:
Application

The Lemon Test and Its

In Lemon v. Kurtzman,42 the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test
that is commonly used to examine displays of religious symbols
challenged pursuant to the Establishment Clause.43
To pass
involvement with the “In God We Trust” license plate; click on “Legislative History” in the
drop down scroll). One of the photographs is Representative Burton presenting a license
plate to his pastor. Id. See also Indiana House of Representatives Republican Caucus: State
Representative Woody Burton, http://www.in.gov/legislative/house_republicans/
homepages/r58/meet.html (last visited on Oct. 13, 2007) (containing information about
Representative Burton on his legislative web page). See also Posting of Advance Indiana:
In Burton Brothers Eric Trusts, http://advanceindiana.blogspot.com/2005/05/in-burtonbrothers-eric-trusts.html (May 20, 2005, 16:58 EST). The author acknowledges that the
neutrality of this website is not known, but merely uses it to present people’s sentiments on
various legal topics in Indiana.
39
Huffstutter, supra note 11, at 14 (quotations omitted).
40
See generally infra Part II.A.1.
41
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding a crèche display, which was
located in a Christmas display, constitutional in part because of the several secularized
displays surrounding it); cf. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S.
573 (1989) (holding that a crèche display on the grand staircase of the county courthouse
violated the Establishment Clause because it endorsed religion). In rendering its opinion,
the Court emphasized the contextual placement of the display and its close relation with
perceived endorsement of religion by the government. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598–602. The
plurality noted that the term endorsement is closely related to the term promotions and
that “any endorsement of religion [i]s ‘invalid[.]’” Id. at 593–95. The plurality rejected
Justice Kennedy’s proselytization test, which required more accommodation by the
government for religious purposes. Id. at 602. The Court in Allegheny also noted other
areas where the Establishment Clause had been violated, such as state-sponsored prayer in
public schools, displaying the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms, and
conditioning the holding of public office by requiring the belief in an existence of God. Id.
at 591 nn.40–41.
42
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
43
Id. at 612–13. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.4 (1992) (noting that “[s]ince
1971, [it] has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases[]” and all have employed the Lemon
test, except Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). See generally STEPHEN V. MONSMA,
WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC
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constitutional muster, a governmental display containing religious
symbols must have a secular purpose; its principal or primary effect
must be one that does not endorse or inhibit religion; and it must not
foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”44 Justice
O’Connor narrowed the focus of Lemon’s purpose and effects prongs by
adding the consideration of whether a reasonable observer would view
the purpose or primary effect of the government’s display of religious
symbols as endorsing religion.45 Although the Court normally defers to

MONEY 111–17 (Rowman & Littlefield 1996) (proposing that the government should adopt a
position of neutrality, remove itself from certain policy-oriented messaging, and neither
favor nor inhibit religion). Monsma posits an interesting view of this theory through the
guise of higher education by claiming that if the government were to remove itself from the
business of financially supporting higher education, then both the secular and religious
institutions would be on a level playing field. Id. at 114. Monsma suggests that the
distinction between sacred and secular is too easily blurred and difficult to apply
consistently and that a neutral approach would avoid this distinction entirely. Id. at 116.
44
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. For purposes of this Note, the two factors of the Lemon test
most applicable are the purpose and endorsement prongs.
45
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94. See also ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory
Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 713–15 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d en banc, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001)
(referencing Justice O’Connor’s concurring view that the main question to address when
seeking the purpose for the law is whether a reasonable observer would find that the
government was endorsing religion); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (quoting Justice O’Connor who
said, “[t]he effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval[]”).
(emphasis omitted). See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (determining that the main
issue was “whether the government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion[]”). However, sometimes Justice O’Connor’s statements are presented as a
separate test, best exemplified when she stated:
The endorsement test does not preclude government from
acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in making
law and policy. It does preclude government from conveying or
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or preferred. Such an endorsement infringes the
religious liberty of the nonadherent, for “[w]hen the power, prestige
and financial support of government is placed behind a particular
religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain.”
Id. at 70 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-780 (1995) (discussing Justice O’Connor’s articulation as to the
“reasonable person[,]” likening it to the reasonable person often used in tort law). The
general standard of endorsement relies on what a member of the overall community would
find offensive, as opposed to what a highly sensitive person may find offensive. Id. See
generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1202–06 (providing a general overview of the
Lemon test in its current form and the uncertain future of the test especially with the ever
evolving make-up of the Court).
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the state legislature’s articulation of a secular purpose, such articulation
must nonetheless “be sincere and not a sham.”46
To determine whether a governmental display of religious symbols
violates the Establishment Clause, the Court looks to the content of the
display (i.e., the components of the display, including any text exhibited
therein), any legislative history concerning the display’s creation, the
historical development of the display, and the contextual placement of
the display.47 Van Orden v. Perry48 and McCreary County v. ACLU of
Kentucky,49 decided on the same day, demonstrate how the Court
evaluates whether the placement of religious symbols on government
property violates the Establishment Clause.50 Both cases involved the
display of the Ten Commandments on government property.51 Yet, after

46
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (discussing that where deeper
investigation reveals that the stated purpose is superfluous, merely inventing a secular
purpose to circumvent an Establishment Clause violation will not suffice). The Court was
presented with a Louisiana law that sought to prohibit the teaching of evolution in public
schools unless it also taught creationism as an alternative theory to promote academic
freedom. Id. at 581–82. The Court conducted a deeper investigation into the legislative
history that led it to conclude that the Balanced Treatment Act was unconstitutional for
lacking a secular purpose. Id. at 596–97. The Court highlighted the personal statements by
the legislator who helped to enact the bill, such as, “evolution is contrary to his family’s
religious beliefs[,]” and “I view this whole battle as one between God and anti-God
forces[.]” Id. at 593, n.14. See also McCreary Cty., Ky., v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–65
(2005) (discussing the continued importance of Lemon’s purpose prong and its effect on the
constitutionality of the overall act or display at issue).
47
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594–95 (discussing the process of ascertaining the purpose behind
a law or a governmental display). Justice Powell’s concurrence further elaborated on this
concept, although he noted, “[a] religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act
of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate.” Id. at 597–99 (Powell and
O’Connor, JJ., concurring). Justice Powell acknowledged the historical significance of
religion in this country and noted that the Bible, if used in a historical context, can be
utilized in an educational setting. Id. at 605–06. He noted that the Bible is the “world’s alltime best seller” and contains “literary and historic value apart from its religious content.”
Id. at 608. However, Justice Scalia suggested that the Court, when determining the purpose
as required by Lemon, meant to determine the “actual” purpose behind the legislative
action and whether the legislature “acted with a ‘sincere’ secular purpose,” not simply
what the out-of-context “legislative purpose” may be. Id. at 613–14 (Rehnquist, C.J. and
Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also noted that the Court, at least at the time of the
Edwards decision, had only invalidated previous laws or displays containing religious
references when it was wholly motivated by a religious purpose. Id. at 614.
48
545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion).
49
545 U.S. 844 (2005).
50
See infra notes 53–63 and accompanying text.
51
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 (involving a challenge by a Texas resident to a monument
displaying the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol as violating
the Establishment Clause); cf. McCreary, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (involving displays of the Ten
Commandments inside Kentucky courthouses and holding that the displays violated the
Establishment Clause).
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evaluating the placement and development of these monuments, the
Court reached two different conclusions regarding whether the Ten
Commandments displays violated the Establishment Clause: in Van
Orden, the Court determined that the display did not violate the
Establishment Clause, whereas in McCreary, the Court determined that
the display did violate the Establishment Clause.52
In Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a four-justice plurality
opinion that failed to apply all three prongs of the Lemon test and instead
pointed to the long legislative history discussing religion’s impact on the
formation of the country as the underpinning of its analysis.53 The Ten
Commandments monument in question had been placed on the grounds
of the Texas State Capitol alongside several other primarily secular
monuments representing the state’s diverse history.54 The Court
determined that it must distinguish whether the display of the Ten
Commandments was merely passive or whether it actively confronted

52
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that, unlike Van Orden,
McCreary was different because of the short and turbulent history surrounding the display,
which revealed that the true purpose behind the display was to endorse religion). See Ind.
Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that Indiana
recently faced a legal challenge to a Ten Commandments monument). Indiana originally
had a monument on its state capitol grounds like the one in Van Orden until it was
destroyed by a vandal and subsequently replaced with the monument that prompted the
litigation. Id. The replacement monument was found to violate the Establishment Clause
even though it contained some historical messages on it. Id. at 773. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the new monument failed Lemon’s purpose prong and its
primary effect was to endorse religion, in part because of the large text displayed on the
monument conveying the Ten Commandments and also because of the monument’s visible
placement on the Statehouse grounds. Id. at 770–73. The court noted that even though the
Ten Commandments may have a secular purpose, the state retains the burden of proving
that it has taken the appropriate steps to prevent a religious purpose. Id. at 771.
53
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682–92. Essentially, the Court applied part of O’Connor’s
modified Lemon test when it determined that, taking into consideration the various factors
that established the monument’s placement, a reasonable observer would not likely find
that the monument endorsed religion. Id. The Court did not fully apply the Lemon test but
instead determined that the test was inapplicable to the current situation. Id. at 686. The
Court noted that in certain contexts, such as school classrooms, the placement of such
religiously affiliated displays has been held unconstitutional. Id. at 690. But here the Court
emphasized the passage of time before the placement of the monument was challenged as
well as the identifiable dual significance of the display which seemed to demonstrate that
the religious effects of the display were merely incidental to the display’s main purpose.
Id. at 691–92.
54
Id. at 682. The Court noted that the monument in question had been on display for
more than forty years and was surrounded by seventeen other monuments and twenty-one
“historical markers,” many of which were secular items that were significant to the
development and identity of Texas’s history. Id. The monument was also paid for by
private funds and clearly inscribed on it was the following message: “[p]resented to the
people and youth of Texas by the Fraternal Order of Eagles of Texas 1961.” Id. at 681–82.
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passersby.55 The plurality found that the monument was merely passive,
evidenced by the fact that the petitioner had walked past the monument
for years prior to bringing the lawsuit.56 Ultimately, the Court held that
the placement of the monument did not violate the Establishment Clause
because “[s]imply having religious content or promoting a message
consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause.”57 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment,
providing the critical fifth vote, stressing that the purpose behind the
monument was primarily secular, noting that its physical placement on
the capitol grounds among several other non-religious displays and its
visibility for more than forty years without objection were reasons that
strongly favored upholding the constitutionality of the Ten
Commandments monument.58
Id. at 691–92; see also ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, Neb., 419 F.3d 772,
776–77 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’g en banc, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a similar Ten
Commandment display donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles more than thirty-five
years prior did not violate the Establishment Clause). Plattsmouth dealt with a Ten
Commandments display similar to the one at issue in Van Orden. Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d at
773–75. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the display did not violate
the Establishment Clause for many of the same reasons articulated in Van Orden. Id. at 775–
78. Furthermore, the Plattsmouth display was also not legally challenged based on its
constitutionality for some thirty-five years, insulating the display from invalidation on
endorsement claims similar to Van Orden because any perceived sectarian nature
surrounding the display lost its effect over time and the display became more passive. Id.
at 778. There was a factual difference between Plattsmouth and Van Orden: the display in
Plattsmouth stood by itself and was not surrounded by other secular displays to detract
from its potential religious message, as was the case in Van Orden. Id. at 777 n.7.
56
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92.
57
Id. at 690 (noting that the placement of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the
capitol was more passive than the display of the Ten Commandments in a school
classroom, which more directly confronts people). See also Alan E. Garfield, What Should
We Celebrate on Constitution Day?, 41 GA. L. REV. 453, 485–89 (2007) (discussing the history
of the monuments and the parties in the lawsuit, and pointing out how the monuments
made their way to the grounds of the Texas State Capitol). Interestingly, the monuments
were part of a publicity stunt by Cecil B. DeMille for his movie, The Ten Commandments. Id.
at 485. DeMille garnered the support of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a group founded by
theater owners, to help erect the monuments around the country. Id. at 485–86. The
monuments were unveiled for public display near the time that the movie opened in
theaters with the help of Charlton Heston and Yul Brynner, both star actors in the movie.
Id. at 486. It was not until forty years later when a homeless, hard-on-his-luck Texas
attorney who passed this monument every day for many years decided to bring suit
challenging it. Id. Garfield described the passionate feelings of both those who wanted to
preserve the religious symbols and those who called for separation. Id. at 487–90.
58
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698–704 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer disagreed with
the plurality’s heavy reliance on the broader historical background of religion in the
country and instead argued for a more pragmatic and fact-sensitive approach. Id. at 698–
99. Justice Breyer also acknowledged that the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a private
organization that is primarily secular in nature, had donated the monument to recognize
55
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On the other hand, in McCreary, the Court held that the placement of
the Ten Commandments display in two Kentucky county courthouses
violated the Establishment Clause.59 The Court focused its analysis on
the purpose prong of the Lemon test and emphasized that the everchanging history behind the placement of the Ten Commandments
revealed that the display lacked the required secular purpose; indeed,
the Court found that the display had been driven by religious
motivation.60 The Court recognized that a Ten Commandments display
the role of the Ten Commandments in shaping civic responsibility. Id. at 701. Likewise, the
placement of the monument on the capitol grounds demonstrated nothing sacred,
evidenced further by the fact that for more than forty years, passersby apparently did not
view the monument as endorsing religion, or at least no one had ever initiated litigation
over the issue. Id. at 702–03. See also ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd.,
210 F.3d 703, 721 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d en banc, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Ohio’s motto, “With God All Things Are Possible[,]” did not offend Lemon’s three pronged
test, even though the phrase was taken from Matthew 19:26, because it was enough
removed from its original biblical source such that a reasonable observer would not view it
as endorsing religion). “The reasonable observer, much like the reasonable person of tort
law, is the embodiment of a collective standard and is thus ‘deemed aware of the history
and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears.’” ACLU
of Ohio, 210 F.3d at 721.
59
McCreary Cty., Ky., v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 873–74 (2005) (holding that
although Lemon’s purpose prong may not always by itself be dispositive, it nonetheless
remains important when determining whether a law or religious display violates the
Establishment Clause; to be sure, the context in which a display was created and also its
development over time must not be overlooked because these facts often provide insight
into the purpose behind a display).
60
Id. at 851–74. The Court discussed the historical development of the display, which
McCreary County had altered three times; each alteration attempted to modify the overall
display by adding more items to it to give it a secular purpose. Id. at 850. For instance,
McCreary County added to the display “historical” items like the Magna Carta, the
Declaration of Independence excerpting the words “endowed by their Creator[,]” and one
document stating that “[t]he Bible is the best gift God has ever given to man[.]” Id. at 853–
54 (alteration in original). The Court pointed out that “‘the display [was][to] be posted in ‘a
very high traffic area’ of the courthouse.’” Id. at 851 (second alteration in original).
Although the Court acknowledged that purpose is an essential element to many
constitutional doctrines, the Court is not required to look for some secret motive. Id. at
861–63. The Court emphasized that the requisite secular purpose cannot be merely
secondary, and Justice O’Connor has stated that the “secular purpose must be serious to be
sufficient.” Id. at 864–65 n.11. But see Books v. Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d 857, 858, 869 (7th Cir.
2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display contained within a “Foundations of
American Law and Government Display” at the local county government building did not
violate the Establishment Clause because the “Foundations” display contained various
other secular items, which detracted from the Ten Commandments potential religious
message, and the placement of the Ten Commandments in the overall display lacked any
religious motivation). Although this case was decided prior to McCreary, it appeared to
suggest that the religious motivation must dominate and that a religious message need not
be absent from the display. Id. at 863; see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987)
(stating, “A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state legislature.
The religious purpose must predominate[]”).
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may potentially have either a secular or religious message.61
Nonetheless, the majority applied Justice O’Connor’s modified Lemon
test and held that, in this case, the Ten Commandments would likely be
perceived as endorsing religion.62 Despite the county’s repeated
attempts to secularize the display by adding other less religiously
focused items to it, the Court noted that given the controversial history
underlying the placement of the Ten Commandments, a reasonable
observer would likely see the religious purpose behind the display.63
Van Orden and McCreary highlight the Court’s diverging views
regarding the Establishment Clause doctrine.64 The four justices who
joined the plurality opinion in Van Orden likely would have upheld the
Ten Commandments display in both cases, whereas the four dissenting
justices in Van Orden likely would have invalidated both displays,
finding that the government had endorsed religion.65 Only Justice
Breyer saw a distinction between the monument in Van Orden and the
monument in McCreary, finding the monument in Van Orden
constitutional, but finding McCreary’s display unconstitutional.66 Van
Orden and McCreary emphasize that the historical development behind

McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869, n.17 (acknowledging that the Ten Commandments have
had an effect on the nation’s legal code and common law). As Justice O’Connor stated in
McCreary, “[i]t is true that many Americans find the Commandments in accord with their
personal beliefs. But we do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment.” Id. at
884 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
62
Id. at 851–74.
63
Id. at 866. The County argued that if any purpose were to be inferred in this case, the
court should determine the purpose only from the latest news concerning the event, not the
display’s history in its entirety. Id. The Court responded by noting that “the world is not
made brand new every morning, and the Counties are simply asking us to ignore perfectly
probative evidence; they want an absentminded objective observer, not one presumed to be
familiar with the history of the government’s actions and competent to learn what history
has to show[.]” Id.
64
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1224–25 (providing an overview of Van Orden and
McCreary, which resulted in opposite holdings, and highlighting the reasoning the Court
applied in each case).
65
Id. at 1224–25. Van Orden’s plurality consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. The dissenters were Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter,
and Ginsburg. Id.
66
Id. See also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701-04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Unlike the four-justice plurality, Justice Breyer’s concurrence considered the purpose
behind the displays and the consequences imposed on the reasonable observer for looking
at it. Id. See also infra Part IV (discussing Justice Breyer’s six interpretative tools—text,
history, tradition, precedent, the purpose of a statute (or display in this case), and the
consequences—which Justice Breyer appeared to utilize when determining the proper
result in Van Orden).
61
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the creation of a governmental display containing religious symbols and
its placement, contextually, may determine its constitutionality.67
2.

Follow the Leader: Coercion Test and Group Norms

Although McCreary served as a reminder that context and placement
are important in determining the constitutionality of a religious symbol
on government property, the potential effects that such a symbol may
have on people should also be considered.68 In Lee v. Weisman,69 Justice
Kennedy discussed the coercive effects of the use of prayer in schools.70
In addition, coercion has also impacted some of the Court’s previous
decisions, particularly those concerning religious symbolism.71 This
Note next examines the Court’s two approaches to considering whether
a religious symbol or message has a coercive effect, as well as
psychological studies that reveal that individuals tend to have an
underlying desire to conform to societal group norms.72

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1224–25 (noting that future cases will have to be
judged in a highly contextual set of circumstances in order to determine the proper
outcome). Chemerinsky also speculated that with the departure of Justice O’Connor from
the Court, similar cases could result in a dramatically different outcome. Id.; see also Mike
Schaps, Comment, Vagueness as a Virtue: Why the Supreme Court Decided the Ten
Commandments Cases Inexactly Right, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1260–61 (2006) (discussing the
convoluted Establishment Clause doctrines, and noting that each case usually involves
specific factual distinctions that determine its outcome).
68
See infra Part II.A.2.
69
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
70
Id. (holding that a prayer at a middle school graduation ceremony violated the
Establishment Clause). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1185 (noting that many
cases involving the use of prayer and other religious activities in schools have been
litigated).
71
See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (recognizing Justice Scalia’s physical
coercion test and Justice Kennedy’s more psychologically based test); McCreary Cty., Ky. v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (acknowledging the effects that posting the Ten
Commandments in a public area may have on people). See also Elizabeth B. Halligan, Note,
Coercing Adults?: The Fourth Circuit and the Acceptability of Religious Expression in Government
Settings, 57 S.C. L. REV. 923, 925 (2006) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has addressed
various public school prayer cases but has dealt with adult prayer only in the legislative
prayer setting). But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 789–92 (1983) (noting that
legislative prayer is different than prayer in schools because it has been around since the
founding of this country and adults are not as impressionable as children); Mellen v.
Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Virginia Military Institute’s dinner
time prayer violated the Establishment Clause due to the coercive elements unique to the
military college).
72
See infra Parts II.A.2.a–b.
67
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Coercion Jurisprudence

Lee involved a challenge to invocations given during graduation
ceremonies by a clergyman at the request of public school officials where
middle and high school students were present.73
Although the
invocations were nonsectarian in nature, Justice Kennedy noted that “[i]t
is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion
or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way [that] ‘establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”74 Justice Kennedy applied
what is sometimes referred to as a psychological coercion test,
emphasizing that the students were more impressionable than adults
and the students did not have a “true” option to decide whether to
attend the graduation ceremony.75
In addition, Justice Kennedy
dismissed the argument that a nonsectarian prayer, or civic religion,
should be allowed, and reasoned that the government should not
involve itself in coordinating invocations to be delivered by clergymen at
public school graduation ceremonies.76 The Court further noted that
73
Lee, 505 U.S. at 580–84 (citing copies of the prayers that were given by the Rabbi at the
respective graduation ceremonies).
74
Id. at 587 (third alteration in original). See also Eric Brander, Hoosiers Choosing God
Controversial ‘In God We Trust’ Plates Showing Up Everywhere, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS,
July 1, 2007, at A3 (noting that BMV Vehicles workers at various locations were allegedly
“pushing” the “In God We Trust” plates on customers). In fact, the state has since sent a
memorandum to all employees stating as follows:
“[w]e want to remind you that while we want to inform customers of
plate selections, as good customer service, employees should not
promote this plate, or any other plate, over another[.]” . . . . “Some
customers have suggested that some branch employees are pushing
the IGWT plate to the exclusion of others. As you are aware, this is not
our policy.”
Id.
75
Lee, 505 U.S. at 592–96. Justice Kennedy highlighted psychological evidence
indicating that adolescents are more likely to be pressured by peers to conform their
behavior to whatever the norm is than adults. Id. The Court noted that although student
attendance at the ceremony was not required, it presented a student the difficult choice to
either be exposed to the invocation or choose to miss the graduation ceremony despite
having worked so diligently to graduate from high school. Id. at 595. Justice Kennedy
noted the potential effects of remaining silent during the prayers and questioned whether
such silence signified respect or subjected the student to subtle coercion. Id. at 593. Justice
Kennedy also recognized the significance of the ceremony for the graduating student and
her family, as well as the sense of accomplishment that accompanies such ceremonies or
other similar events. Id. at 595. He dismissed the government’s position that the majority’s
preference should prevail over the dissenting minority’s position and that individuals who
associate with the minority position should simply not attend the ceremony if truly
offended. Id. at 596.
76
Id. at 589–90 (noting that James Madison cautioned against having the government
remove itself from the business of religion). Justice Kennedy noted that the government
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under the First Amendment not all religion must be removed from the
public sphere, but that “the measure of constitutional adjudication is the
ability and willingness to distinguish between [the] real threat and mere
shadow.”77 The Court determined that under Lemon, the prayers at the
graduation ceremony amounted to government endorsement of
religion.78
In sharp contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lee embraced historical
evidence to support his contention that the nation is intertwined with
religion and that such intertwinement does not amount to endorsement
of religion.79 Justice Scalia explained that unconstitutional coercion
occurs only when the government actually forces conduct or threatens
the individual if he fails to act.80 Justice Scalia criticized Justice
Kennedy’s psychological coercion test, describing it as unfounded and
an “embarrassment” to the Establishment Clause.81 Indeed, the dissent
dismissed psychologically coercive evidence and its potential underlying
effects.82
b.

“In or Out”: Group Norms

Although psychological studies are not always well received by
courts, extensive research has established the impact that symbolism and
messages have on people.83 One aspect of this research deals with group
should not show favoritism toward any religion. Id. at 590. “[I]n the hands of government
what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to
indoctrinate and coerce.” Id. at 591–92. See also Saumya Manohar, Comment, Look Who’s
Talking Now: “Choose Life” License Plates and Deceptive Government Speech, 25 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 229, 235–36 (2006) (discussing psychological theories that explain the dangers
posed by the government endorsing a message through covert means).
77
Lee, 505 U.S. at 598.
78
Id. at 584–86.
79
Id. at 632–36 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
80
Id. at 640–44.
81
Id. at 636. Justice Scalia compared the Court’s reliance on psychology to that of
interior decorating, noting that the Court has delved into an area that it is not equipped to
handle. Id. Justice Scalia dismissed the Court’s position that the students were essentially
obligated to attend the ceremony and were therefore coerced. Id. Justice Scalia also
questioned the Court’s protective nature toward students, especially those in high school
who are old enough to vote, noting that the Court does not extend adults a similar
protective blanket regarding the possible coercive effects of religious invocations at events.
Id. at 639.
82
See infra Part II.A.2.b.
83
MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 74 (Harper & Row 1966)
(explaining how social norms can transform into powerful tools in group settings). Sherif
noted that some slogans or phrases, once they are standardized, can become so engrained
in the public psyche that they can move people to action. Id. For instance, Sherif posits the
phrases, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity[,]” used during the French Revolution; “Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness[,]” common to the United States revolution; and “[t]o
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norms.84 The theory of group norms is that members of a group
influence each other, which leads to relative uniformity in the beliefs and
behaviors of the individuals within the group.85 This theory is founded
on the idea that an individual’s desire to espouse a view that is deemed
correct is outweighed by the fear of being isolated by other members of
the group.86 Numerous studies have demonstrated the effects that a
group can have on an individual member’s desire to conform to the
group.87
Solomon Asch’s Line Study is illustrative.88 Asch’s experiment
demonstrates that a high percentage of people, when placed within
make the world safe for democracy[,]” a common war time expression and a phrase often
used to justify the current War on Terror. Id. Sherif cautioned about the dangers of such
phrases and their power to be used by leaders and other persons to call others into action.
Id. See also Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (discussing the effects of coercion, Justice Kennedy noted,
“[t]he concern may not be limited to the context of schools, but it is most pronounced
there[]”); John Valery White, Brown v. Board of Education and the Origins of the Activist
Insecurity in Civil Rights Law, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 303 (2002) (discussing the legal system’s
skepticism of psychological data in light of Brown v. Board of Education and the criticism
directed at the Court for using only sociological data, and no law, to support its decision).
84
SHERIF, supra note 83, at 85 (noting that in any organized society, norms “serve as focal
points in the experience of the individual, and subsequently as guides for [the individual’s]
actions[]”). Group norms regulate everyday life and people often subconsciously adhere to
them. Id. Norms often form through people’s frames of reference, which serve as the basis
for people’s stereotypes, customs, and values. Id. Once a person has a frame of reference,
he or she can later adapt this frame of reference based on the new stimuli presented. Id.
85
LEON FESTINGER, STANLEY SCHACHTER, & KURT BLACK, SOCIAL PRESSURES IN INFORMAL
GROUPS: A STUDY OF HUMAN FACTORS IN HOUSING 72 (Stanford Univ. Press 1950). This
book noted that pressures exerted on a group can be overt or hidden, and at times can be
formalized. Id. at 101. Examples of these social pressures are as follows: people opening
doors for others, particularly men for women; the way people dress for certain situations;
and the types of career paths certain people take, such as following the family business. Id.
See also GENEVIEVE PAICHELER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE 82 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (illustrating the underlying principle of group norms by quoting Hans
Christian Anderson: “[t]here were five little peas in a pod, they were green, the pod was
green, they believed that the entire world was green and for them this was certainly true!”)
(quotation omitted); Manohar, supra note 76, at 236 (warning that nontransparent
government messages can potentially indoctrinate the public).
86
PAICHELER, supra note 85, at 82 (highlighting the impact of majority influences).
Paicheler pointed out that a person’s decisions are heavily tied to those of the group
around him. Id. “This is true in two respects: he fears a negative judgment and seeks to
induce positive evaluations; he relies on others in establishing a point of view that agrees
with [the rest of the group].” Id.
87
See infra notes 88–90. See generally Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An
Expressive Jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 77 (2007) (discussing
the Establishment Clause’s coercion tests, the psychological theory of expressive attitudes,
and this theory’s effect on people in real situations).
88
PAICHELER, supra note 85, at 84–90 (discussing the experiment and its findings).
Another study likely known to people who have completed a basic undergraduate-level
psychology class is Stanley Milgram’s Shock Experiment, which revealed that people,
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group settings, are likely to conform to the behaviors and beliefs
expressed by those around them.89 Most of the subjects in the
experiment claimed they actually subscribed to the ideas espoused by
members of the group and gave false answers merely because they did
not want to express views different than those of their peers.90 Thus, the
theory of group norms suggests that external messages often lead people
to change their behaviors in order to conform to the group.91
From a review of the intricately woven Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the following principles emerge: (1) the governmental
display containing religious symbols must have a secular purpose; (2)
the display’s principal or primary effect should not be seen by the
reasonable observer as endorsing religion; and (3) there should not be an
excessive entanglement between the government and religion.92 To
when given “suggestions” by an authoritative figure, in this case the experimenter,
followed these “suggestions[,]” even where doing so caused them to behave contrary to
accepted social norms. Id. at 89–90.
89
Id. at 85. Asch’s experiment consisted of groups of seven to nine people, and only one
confederate (i.e., an individual who was “in” on the experiment) was placed in each group.
Id. Asch then presented each group with one standard line of a specified length and then
three comparison lines that varied in length consisting of small, medium, and large. Id.
One of the three comparison lines was an exact match to the standard line, and those that
did not match the standard line were intentionally made to obviously not match. Id. The
confederates gave false responses on seven out of twelve matching attempts, so that Asch
could assess how the unsuspecting subjects would respond to this perplexing situation. Id.
90
Id. Participants stated that social motivations, and not the desire to be correct, were
their main concern. Id. Other concerns may have been that the collective group could not
be wrong or that the subject did not want to be different. Id. As Asch posited, they became
“indifferent to the task; they became unconcerned with it, no longer worried about the
imprecision of their judgments. Their sole objective was not to stand out, not to deviate.”
Id. Asch himself stated,
A theory of social influences must take into account the pressures
upon persons to act contrary to their beliefs and values. They are
likely to bring to the fore powerful forces that arise from the social
milieu at the same time that they may reveal forces, perhaps no less
powerful, that individuals can mobilize to resist coercion and threats
to their integrity . . . Current thinking has stressed the power of social
conditions to induce psychological changes arbitrarily. It has taken
slavish submission to group forces as the general fact and neglected or
implicitly denied the capacities of men for independence, for rising
under certain conditions above group passion and prejudice. Our
present task is to observe directly the interaction between individuals
and groups when the paramount issue is that of remaining
independent or submitting to social pressure.
Id.
91
See supra Part II.A.2.b (discussing the theory of group norms and its application in
various psychological studies).
92
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (describing the Lemon test and its
pronged approach).
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determine whether the governmental display of religious symbols
violates the aforementioned test, courts consider various elements,
including the history behind the display, public statements by
government officials during the legislative process, where the display is
placed on government property, and what items are included in the
display.93
Additional considerations underlying a potential
Establishment Clause violation when a government display contains
religious symbols are whether government coercion is present and the
displays affect on group norms.94
B. Compelled Speech Cases
The Supreme Court recognizes two doctrines regarding compelled
speech.95 The first doctrine maintains that the government cannot force a
person to endorse or express a message with which he disagrees.96
Wooley v. Maynard97 illustrated this principle. In Wooley, a New
Hampshire resident covered up the state’s motto—“Live Free or Die”—
on his license plate because he “refuse[d] to be coerced by the State into
advertising a slogan which [he found] morally, ethically, religiously, and
politically abhorrent.”98 The Court held that the New Hampshire
See supra note 47 and accompanying text (same as above).
See supra Parts II.A.2.a–b (articulating Justice Kennedy’s psychologically based
coercion test, Justice Scalia’s opposing physical coercion analysis, and the theory of group
norms and its greater impact on society’s behaviors).
95
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (discussing the differences
between compelled subsidies and pure government speech).
96
Id. See supra note 74. This Note does not discuss the precise issues addressed in
Wooley because Indiana has not made “In God We Trust” its only official license plate.
However, this Note explores complaints by the public that have asserted that the “In God
We Trust” license plates have been ‘forced’ on some people by BMV employees, and the
implicit coercive effects of group norms that could result from such actions by BMV
employees. See supra note 74.
97
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
98
Id. at 713. Since 1969, the State of New Hampshire has required that license plates on
non-commercial vehicles display the State’s motto, “Live Free or Die[.]” Id. at 707. Under
New Hampshire law it was a misdemeanor to knowingly obscure or cover the
alphanumeric combination on the license plate, including the state motto. Id. In 1974, the
petitioners, devout Jehovah’s Witnesses, began to cover up the state motto on their license
plate because they found it objectionable. Id. at 707–08. During a state court trial, in which
Mr. Maynard represented himself, the court imposed a twenty-five dollar fine, but
suspended it in return for good behavior. Id. at 708. Mr. Maynard, however, continued to
object to promoting the state motto on his license plate (by covering up the motto) and after
a second trial date, was sentenced to fifteen days in county jail. Id. See generally West Va.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding a West Virginia law unconstitutional
because it compulsorily required students to pledge allegiance to the flag or else face
expulsion and because it imposed possible criminal sanctions against both students and
parents).
93
94
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legislature could not constitutionally require its citizens to “display the
state motto upon their vehicle license plates[]” or face criminal
sanctions.99
The second doctrine involves the government compelling citizens to
subsidize the government’s messages. In sharp contrast to Wooley, the
Court in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n100 rejected claims brought by
beef growers who challenged a government imposed tax aimed at
subsidizing the government sponsored promotional campaign—“Beef.
It’s What’s for Dinner.”101 The Court upheld the tax, reasoning that the
government may compel subsidization from its citizens for its various
governmental messages, provided that the government identifies itself as
the speaker.102 After Johanns, even where the government engages in
viewpoint discrimination, the government appears to have wide-ranging
discretion concerning how it subsidizes its own message.103 This is true
regardless of whether private citizens volunteer to advocate the
message.104 However, when the government creates and funds a private
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714, 717 (footnote omitted).
544 U.S. 550 (2005).
101
Id. at 553–55 (discussing the Beef Growers of America, which, funded by various beef
producers on behalf of the government, produced the familiar advertisements of “Beef. It’s
What’s for Dinner[]”); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 385 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boyce,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102
See generally Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559 (holding that when the government speaks, and is
sufficiently accountable for its own speech, it can compel the public to subsidize the
message; in these instances, the government is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny).
“[C]ompelled support of a private association is fundamentally different from compelled
support of government.” Id. (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13
(1977)). But cf. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (holding that the
government could not compel the mushroom grower, United Foods, to advertise a
government message when the mushroom grower objected to the speech asserting the
regulatory purpose was purely advertising and not some broader government regulatory
scheme).
103
See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557.
104
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 377-78 (noting that drivers who select the “Choose Life” license
plate are volunteering to carry forth the government’s message because “they pay out of
their own pockets for the privilege of putting the government-crafted message on their
private property[]”). See also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559 (discussing the newly defined power
of the government speech doctrine). In Johanns, Justice Scalia commented,
“Compelled support of government”—even those programs of
government one does not approve—is of course perfectly
constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest. And some government
programs involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a position. “The
government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and
policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties.
Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by
the government will be spent for speech and other expression to
advocate and defend its own polices.”
Id.
99

100
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forum for speech, it is not permitted to discriminate based on viewpoints
contained in the message,105 nor is it permitted to compel people to pay
for the message of a private group.106 Ultimately, the government may
neither force a private citizen to speak nor compel a citizen to pay for a
private entity’s message with which he disagrees.107
Crucial to deciding whether a compelled subsidy is constitutional is
determining who is speaking and whose message is being advanced.108
The Supreme Court has decided several cases that have addressed the
issue of who is speaking and the limits to which the government may
compel a citizen to subsidize the message.109 However, the Fourth and
Sixth Circuit’s “Choose Life” license plate cases have specifically dealt
with speech upon license plates and these cases illustrate the important
distinction between government and private speech.110 Parts II.B.1–2
explores these “Choose Life” license plate cases in greater depth.111
1.

Government Speech

In ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen,112 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the constitutionality of a Tennessee law that permitted a local
pro-life organization to create a specialty license plate promoting its
See generally Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc., v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794–99 (4th Cir.
2004). See also United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413–16 (determining that the compelled subsidy for
the mushroom growers’ advertising campaign was unconstitutional because the speech, by
itself, was the principal object of the campaign and not as part of some broader regulatory
scheme).
106
Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 (holding that the government may not compel subsidies of
union workers for political campaigns with which the union workers disagreed, but may
compel the workers to pay for activities related to collective bargaining). But cf. Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (holding that compelled subsidies for
agricultural marketing that focused on California fruit growers was constitutional because
subsidy for the marketing was part of a larger regulatory scheme to promote government
speech).
107
See supra notes 96, 105–06 and accompanying text.
108
ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 385 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boyce, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Serv., Inc. v.
Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430–32 (S.D. W.Va. 2007) (noting the constitutional
importance of determining who is speaking because citizens cannot challenge the funding
of government speech, but may attack compelled funding of private speech).
109
See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
110
See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375–80 (upholding the “Choose Life” license plate as
permissible government speech). But see Rose, 361 F.3d at 786 (finding South Carolina’s
“Choose Life” license plates were a mixture of government and private speech and so
impermissible). See generally Manohar, supra note 76, at 229–31 (discussing the different
approaches taken by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits in their analysis of the “Choose Life”
license plate”).
111
See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
112
441 F.3d 370.
105
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ideology.113 The ACLU of Tennessee initiated a lawsuit because prochoice groups were being denied the ability to create such a plate to
further their viewpoint.114 In determining whether Tennessee’s “Choose
Life” license plate was government or private speech, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying Johanns, held that the State of Tennessee had
acted within its constitutional limits because the plate constituted
government speech.115
The court in Bredesen reasoned that Johanns applied because the State
of Tennessee, through the statute it enacted, determined and had final
approval of the message that appeared on the license plate.116 Although
the court conceded that individuals who chose to display the “Choose
Life” license plate were engaging in expressive conduct, such actions did
not create a private forum.117 The government was conveying its own
message, even if it did not expressly identify itself as the speaker, and
incidental help the government received from private organizations had
little relevance.118 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals referred to Johanns
Id. at 371–72.
Id. at 372–73. The Tennessee legislature enacted into law a statute that permitted the
creation of the “Choose Life” license plates. Id. at 372. During the same legislative session
that created the “Choose Life” plates, Planned Parenthood attempted to persuade the
Tennessee legislature to create a “Pro-Choice” license plate as well, but was unsuccessful.
Id. The district court relied on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Rose and determined that
mixed speech was occurring and held that the license plate engaged in viewpoint
discrimination. Id. at 372–73.
115
Id. at 375. See generally Manohar, supra note 76, at 229 (providing an in-depth
discussion of the main issues that were presented and the analysis used by the Sixth Circuit
for its holding in Bredesen).
116
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376–77. Even though parts of the message were developed by
New Life, a religious group, the state still maintained the overall veto power to approve or
deny the message and control the design of the plate. Id. The plaintiffs argued that it was
really “mixed speech” taking place, but the court dismissed this argument. Id.
117
Id. at 377. The court distinguished Tennessee’s “Choose Life” license plates from the
“Live Free or Die” plates at issue in Wooley because Tennessee motorists were not
compelled to display the “Choose Life” message, but instead had to purchase the plate as a
specialty plate. Id. at 377–78.
118
Id. at 376–77. In regard to the first factor, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
noted that it is not implausible that the state would use a specialty license plate program to
promote its message. Id. at 376. This is further evidenced by the fact that Tennessee allows
many organizations to promote messages while it restricts some organizations from doing
so. Id. The second factor was analogized to Johanns in which the beef promotion messages
were “outsourced” to another entity but the Secretary of Agriculture still had the final
approval of the message. Id. at 377. The court noted that the third factor, also compared to
the promotional message in Johanns, determined that any reasonable person would
attribute a state-issued license plate to the government’s issuing of a message. Id. The
court did note that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rose ruled to the contrary.
Id. at 380. However, the court dismissed the Fourth Circuit’s ruling because the Supreme
Court’s decision in Johanns, which was decided after the Fourth Circuit made its decision,
established a new test that clearly identified the speech in Bredesen as government speech.
113
114
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and also Rust v. Sullivan119 to determine that “[n]o constitutionally
significant distinction exists between volunteer disseminators and paid
disseminators.”120
The dissent suggested that the majority misapplied Johanns in this
situation because the speech was not compelled.121 Rather than focus on
the specific “Choose Life” license plate, the dissenting judge explained
that the license plate program as a whole encouraged private speech, and
that the state merely provided the medium of exchange.122 The judge
Id. Also, the court did not think that the Fourth Circuit’s analysis would apply well to this
case. Id.
119
500 U.S. 173 (1991). Rust involved doctors who worked at a medical clinic that
received government funds. Id. at 178. After issuing government funds to the medical
clinic, the government prohibited the doctors from discussing abortion or any other related
topics with their patients. Id. at 178–82. The doctors disagreed with this policy and
challenged it; however, the Court held that when a private entity receives public funds, the
government has the right to condition receipt of those funds on the fact that that the
message disseminated is consistent with the government’s wishes. Id. at 183, 196–200.
120
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 378 (comparing the doctors in Rust to the Tennessee “volunteers”
who put the message on their license plates). Similar to Rust, the Bredesen court determined
that if a forum were created, it would force the state to produce messages that run counter
to its interests. Id. at 378–79. But see Manohar, supra note 76, at 230–31 (discussing the
dangers of permitting the government to speak in deceptive ways). An interesting
example of such hidden speech highlighted in the article was that in the years between
2003 and 2005, “at least twenty federal agencies spent $1.6 billion making and distributing
[to local television stations] prepackaged news segments[,]” which “praised various
administration policies ranging from the war in Iraq to fighting computer viruses.” Id.
121
Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 380–85 (Boyce, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(discussing that the majority’s decision allows the “government speech doctrine” to
broadly control and take over the First Amendment analysis). Judge Boyce pointed to two
flawed areas in the majority’s reasoning: the mischaracterization of the specialty license
plate program and mistaken application of compelled subsides, where nothing was
compelled. Id. at 380–81. Tennessee did not compel citizens to pay for the “Choose Life”
specialty plate, but instead charged an additional fee to only those people who chose this
plate. Id. at 384. Accordingly, Judge Boyce noted that if the citizens of Tennessee had been
compelled to subsidize a “Choose Life” message, then it would have been more plausible
that Johanns apply. Id. at 387.
122
Id. at 382–84. Judge Boyce, concurring in Bredesen, highlighted that Tennessee had
about 150 license plates available for motorists to choose from and that many of these
plates had little to do with a government interest. Id. at 382–83. Judge Boyce also noted
that Tennessee promoted its specialty license plate program by offering specialty plates for
persons who preferred to show their support for their school or community rather than the
government. Id. at 384. Another line of support that favored a finding that Tennessee was
in reality promoting private speech, not government speech, was that the state required
1,000 people to preorder the “Choose Life” plates before it began to distribute them. Id.
Judge Boyce noted that despite fears expressed by the majority, the Fourth Circuit’s
holding in Rose had not led to the “doomsday scenario” of organizations like the Ku Klux
Klan or the Nazi party taking their messages to the state’s license plates. Id. at 391. Thus,
Tennessee could continue to maintain viewpoint neutral regulations as long as it required
that 1,000 paid orders be placed before the plate is issued. Id. However, if a group were
able to garner the necessary number of signatures, then the state would have to issue the
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penned the following statement regarding who the First Amendment is
designed to protect: “The First Amendment was not written for the vast
majority of [Tennesseans]. It belongs to a single minority of one.”123
Despite the dissent’s position, Bredesen’s majority determined that
Johanns’ reasoning was persuasive and fully applicable to the instant
case.124 Thus, Tennessee’s “Choose Life” license plate was government
speech and as such was not susceptible to a compelled subsidy
challenge.125
2.

A Mixed Bag: Government and Private Speech

In contrast to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Planned Parenthood of South Carolina v. Rose126
determined that South Carolina’s “Choose Life” license plates contained
both government and private speech.127 The law that permitted these
specialty plates to be distributed to motorists was very detailed, as were
other specialty plate programs in South Carolina.128 Although Planned
Parenthood never applied for specialty plates, litigation ensued
challenging the State of South Carolina on the grounds that the new
“Choose Life” license plates discriminated based on viewpoint.129 After
plates. Id. But, as Judge Boyce noted, no evidence suggested that states had been flooded
with requests for Ku Klux Klan or other similar plates. Id.
123
Id. (alteration in original).
124
See supra notes 116–20 and accompanying text.
125
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
126
361 F.3d 786, 787 (4th Cir. 2004).
127
Id. at 777. Cf. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 391 (Boyce, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
128
Rose, 361 F.3d at 788–89 (discussing the specificity of South Carolina’s statute as to
who could purchase the “Choose Life” plates). Drivers who wanted the plates not only
had to pay a fee but also were required to register with the organization that was going to
receive the funds. Id. at 788.
129
Id. at 787–89. In 2001, South Carolina enacted a statute that authorized the creation of
a “Choose Life” specialty license plate for purchase by South Carolina drivers. Id. at 788.
Each person who purchased one of these license plates was required to pay an additional
fee beyond the normal cost associated with plate registration. Id. Any group that wanted
to create a specialty plate could do so by meeting certain qualifications and applying to the
Department of Public Safety (“DPS”), but DPS could deny or modify the plate if it deemed
it inappropriate or offensive to the greater community. Id. Although Planned Parenthood
never applied to DPS for a specialty plate, Planned Parenthood had lobbied the South
Carolina legislature to pass a bill creating a “Pro-Choice” plate but was not successful. Id.
Interestingly, the general statute for specialty license plates in South Carolina specified that
a specialty plate was available only to certified members of the respective organization and
that such a plate could contain only a symbol or emblem of the organization. Id. at 789.
However, the statute that created the “Choose Life” plate permitted the phrase “Choose
Life[,]” clearly more than only a symbol or emblem, to be displayed on the plate, and the
statute also indicated that the plate was available to anyone who wanted it. Id. Even
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the court determined that Planned Parenthood had standing because
they had a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, it addressed
the First Amendment question regarding whether South Carolina’s
“Choose Life” plates amounted to government or private speech.130 In
deciding this question, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a
four-factor test.131 The test consisted of determining “the central purpose
of the program in which the speech in question occur[red][,]” the degree
of editorial control by the speaker, the identity of the actual speaker, and
the party that bore the ultimate responsibility for the message.132
Applying this four-factor test, the Rose court found that the purpose
of the “Choose Life” plate was to promote the State’s preferred pro-life
viewpoint and that the State had editorial control over the message
displayed on the plate.133 Reasoning further, the court decided that the
third and fourth factors cut in favor of private speech because the
message on a specialty plate is usually identified with the person
displaying it.134 Ultimately, the court concluded that the message
though Planned Parenthood did not apply for a specialty plate under the general statute, it
was not required to because it contended that doing so would permit it to display only a
symbol or emblem of a pro-choice organization, not to display the phrase “Pro-Choice” on
the plate (like the “Choose Life” plate), thus, still leading to discrimination. Id. at 791.
130
Id. at 789–92 (holding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a personal stake in the outcome
of the litigation, which made the controversy redressable). If the “In God We Trust” license
plates are challenged pursuant to the First Amendment compelled subsidy doctrine,
standing is likely to be a contested issue. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 60–64
(explaining the basic doctrine of standing and both the constitutional and prudential
purposes served by the doctrine). Within the confusing doctrine of standing is the concept
of generalized grievances and taxpayer standing. Id. at 90–98. The Supreme Court has
held that a taxpayer, in general, does not have standing to litigate a case because he merely
shares “a general interest common to all members of the public.” Id. at 92. However, one
exception recognized by the Court, though subsequently narrowed, was in Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968). Id. Flast established a two-prong test to allow petitioners to achieve
taxpayer standing in a case in which the government had allegedly violated the
Establishment Clause by subsidizing various religious institutions. Id. at 92–93. See
generally Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that a Texas tax
exemption offered to individuals who purchased certain religious publications that were
used primarily for teaching religious texts was unconstitutional for violating the
Establishment Clause because it was too narrowly written, provided benefits only for
religious purposes, and lacked a secular purpose).
131
Rose, 361 F.3d at 792–93.
132
Id. The Rose court applied the test from Sons of Confederate Veterans and found that the
license plates consisted of private speech. Id. at 793.
133
Id. at 793–94. The court noted that, unlike the “Choose Life” license plate in Sons of
Confederate Veterans, this “Choose Life” license plate was developed through the legislative
process and signed into law by the Governor. Id. at 793. The plate in Sons of Confederate
Veterans had originated with the state, and the state had determined that the plate would
read “Choose Life.” Id.
134
Id. at 793–94. The Rose court relied on Wooley for the proposition that “even messages
on standard license plates are associated at least partly with the vehicle owners.” Id. at 794.
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contained on a specialty license plate is both government and private
speech, and, thus, applying a bright-line rule would oversimplify the
situation.135 The Rose court, explaining that license plates contain mixed
speech, referenced Wooley and noted that the association between the
message displayed on the plate and the vehicle owner is even stronger
when a specialty plate is at issue.136
The Rose court then held that South Carolina had engaged in
viewpoint discrimination because it permitted a pro-life message but
denied a pro-choice message.137 The court explained that allowing the
pro-life message to dominate the forum could mislead people to believe
that most South Carolinians adopt a pro-life position.138 This rationale
parallels what the Supreme Court has cautioned against in the
Establishment Clause context, specifically that “[e]ndorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”139
Although the Rose court briefly acknowledged that the speech
implicated the government because the legislature enacted the specialty
license plate program, it dismissed this argument as shortsighted for
failing to recognize the unique nature of specialty license plates.140 When
The court noted that this association is strengthened when the vehicle owner displays a
specialty license plate. Id. As the Rose court pointed out, a person who sees someone with
a “Choose Life” license plate would correctly assume that the person holds a pro-life view.
Id. The court analogized the situation to that of a bumper sticker identifying the message
of its owner and not that of its manufacturer. Id. The court concluded, unlike its holding in
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., that such speech is not completely private speech, but
rather it contains both government and private speech. Id. See also ACLU of Tenn. v.
Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 386 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas Jefferson who once said, “‘To
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical[]’”).
135
Rose, 361 F.3d at 794.
136
Id.; see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (in referencing
Wooley, the court noted that “[o]bliging people to ‘use their private property as a ‘mobile
billboard’ for the State’s ideological message’ amounted to impermissible compelled
expression[]”)
137
Rose, 361 F.3d at 794.
138
Id. at 798. See also Manohar, supra note 76, at 234–36. Manohar highlighted two major
concerns with allowing the government to hide behind private volunteers. The first
concern is that it enables the government to dominate the marketplace of ideas without the
visible check of the political process. Id. at 234. The second concern is that it enables the
government to indoctrinate the minds of both the messengers and receivers of the message;
the more force the government has in controlling the market, the less ability the private
individual has to counter this force. Id.
139
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)
140
Rose, 361 F.3d at 798–99. See also Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL
178455, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan 19, 2007), rev’d, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008). Recently, in Choose
Life Ill., Inc. v. White, the Northern District of Illinois adopted the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning
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license plates promote a wide array of messages, the identity of the
government as speaker is often obscured.141 After Johanns, determining
the speaker is critical to the outcome of the litigation because who is
speaking—the government or a private individual—determines whether
the subsidization of the speech is exempt from First Amendment
analysis.142
III. ANALYSIS
An idiosyncrasy triggered by Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license
plates is the issue of who is speaking—the government or the private
individual. Not only is the identification of the speaker essential to the
outcome in compelled subsidy challenges,143 but also the distinction is
important in the Establishment Clause context as well.144 Indiana would
likely contend that “In God We Trust” is government speech to avoid a
compelled subsidy claim, and it would also likely claim “In God We
Trust” to be patriotic to avoid Establishment Clause concerns. However,
if “In God We Trust” is classified as religious, then Indiana may claim
the plate to be private speech, in an attempt to distance itself from the
phrase and overcome an Establishment Clause challenge.145 Part III
analyzes this dichotomy of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
from Rose and held that specialty license plates constitute private speech, especially
because the specialty plates at issue were initiated by a private organization that
maintained considerable editorial control over them. Id.. The Northern District of Illinois
Court, much like the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rose, recognized that
license plates contain aspects of government speech. Id. at *6. Yet, when a private
individual, who has paid for a plate that carries a particular message, displays the plate, it
becomes private speech. Id. But see Choose Life Ill., Inc., 547 F.3d at 855-56 (The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Northern District of Illinois, however, concluding
that Illinois had engaged in permissible content regulation because it did not permit any
specialty license plates dealing with the subject of abortion, regardless of viewpoint). Yet,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court’s finding that license
plates, particularly specialty ones, are a mixture of government and private speech and that
after Johanns, the four-factor test from Rose remains the best mode of analysis to determine
who is speaking. Id. at 859–64.
141
Rose, 361 F.3d at 798–99.
142
See Manohar, supra note 76, at 229 (highlighting the constitutional importance of
defining who is speaking—the government or a private entity—in determining whether the
law in question is valid).
143
See supra Part II.B.
144
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000). The Supreme Court held
that students’ self-initiated prayers before high school football games, which were
permitted by the school district, violated the Establishment Clause. Id. The Court
concluded, “there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion,
which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.” Id. at 302.
145
See infra Parts III.A–B.
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compelled subsidy doctrines as applied to Indiana’s “In God We Trust”
license plates, which, in the end, will likely determine the
constitutionality of the plates.146
A. Applying the Establishment Clause: Context, Purpose, and Coercion
The current state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence often leaves
courts confused as to how to apply the various doctrines to the issues
presented.147 In fact, the Supreme Court in McCreary summarized this
confusion as follows:
[I]t has been clear that Establishment Clause
doctrine lacks the comfort of categorical absolutes. In
special instances we have found good reason to hold
governmental action legitimate even where its manifest
purpose was presumably religious. No such reasons
present themselves here.148
Indeed, challenges to the Establishment Clause are often highly fact
specific as courts examine many variables.149 At times, the Establishment
Clause’s lack of definitional precision resembles the Court’s imprecise
obscenity or pornography jurisprudence, where Justice Stewart
acknowledged the Court was “trying to define what may be
indefinable[,]” but that he knew a violation when he saw it; perhaps in
this case, despite a clear standard, a reasonable observer knows when an
entity endorses religion.150 Part III.A highlights analytical gaps in the
Court’s current Establishment Clause jurisprudence with regard to
examining the context, purpose, and coercive effects of Indiana’s “In
God We Trust” plates.151
1.

Revealing Context and Purpose

Applying Establishment Clause jurisprudence to Indiana’s “In God
We Trust” license plates presents an interesting conflict because of the

See infra Parts III.A–B.
See supra Part II.A.1.
148
McCreary Cty., Ky., v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 n.10 (2005) (citation omitted).
149
Id. at 891–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting the various areas in which the Court
has upheld laws that seemed to favor religion).
150
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting Justice
Stewart’s oft-quoted statement “I know it when I see it[]” (“it” referring to obscenity),
made in reference to an obscene motion picture that was exhibited to an audience in
violation of Ohio law).
151
See infra Parts III.A.1–2.
146
147
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phrase used on the plates and the public discourse surrounding the
adoption of the plates.152 In analyzing cases involving governmental
displays of religious symbols, the Court has focused on history and
context and has suggested that history and context often reveal the true
purpose behind a display of religious symbols.153 Since its adoption, the
national motto—“In God We Trust”—has survived legal challenges, and
indeed, the use of the motto by itself would not likely violate the
Establishment Clause.154 However, having placed the motto “In God We
Trust” on Indiana’s license plates, Indiana has taken the phrase to a
whole new medium and context that lacks the long history and common
usage that has purportedly absolved the phrase of any religious
connotation.155
See infra notes 153–80 and accompanying text.
See Schaps, supra note 67, at 1256–57 (stating that the Court must consider the past
actions in their entirety because “purpose matters[]”’). Justice Breyer holds this view—that
context and the historical development of the item in question matters. Id. at 1258–60.
154
See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir.
2001) (noting that at least three other circuits have upheld the national motto, “In God We
Trust[,]” as constitutional under alleged Establishment Clause violations). The Sixth
Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court has never questioned the motto against its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but that the motto would likely withstand any
potential attack regarding its validity. Id.; see also Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1989) (stating that the national motto and the pledge of allegiance
have been considered in dicta of Supreme Court decisions and found to be ceremonial
deism). See generally ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Sq. Rev. & Advis. Board, 210 F.3d 703, 720–
22 (6th Cir. 2000) (highlighting that the motto is ceremonial deism protected from the
Establishment Clause jurisprudence because it has lost its religious message). In ACLU of
Ohio, the Sixth Circuit noted two decisions from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which found
that the national motto does not offend the Constitution and would not, by itself, endorse
religion to a reasonable observer. Id. at 721–22. See also supra note 134 (this Note is not
arguing that the national motto itself violates the Establishment Clause, but rather that its
usage in this new context, on a license plate, violates the Establishment Clause, especially
when viewed in light of surrounding evidence). Similarly, “In God We Trust” displayed
on a license plate contains an attribution problem due to the complexities of whether this is
a private statement or endorsement from the government. Supra note 134. See generally
ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 377 (6th Cir. 2006). Yet, license plates are
government property and issued by the government, and thus they still can be identified
with the government promoting this message, especially when it is the legislature that
enacted this bill and chose to single it out as a cost-free alternative. Id.
155
See supra notes 64–67 (discussing how the long history, tradition, and context of the
monuments in Van Orden were important to upholding their validity, and how Justice
Breyer, who provided the concurring vote in Van Orden, found these elements especially
important to finding the monuments constitutional). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
597 (1992) (noting that Establishment Clause cases are highly fact sensitive). See Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 603. Although “there is an obvious distinction between crèche displays and
references to God in the [national] motto and the pledge[,] . . . [and] history may affect the
constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion by the government, history cannot
legitim[iz]e practices that demonstrate the government’s allegiance to a particular sect or
creed.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Court continued:
152
153

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/9

Kulwinski: Trust in God Going Too Far: Indiana's "In God We Trust" License P

2009]

Indiana’s “In God We Trust” License Plates

1353

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Indiana Civil Liberties Union
v. O’Bannon156 reiterated that context matters when determining whether
a religious symbol (or phrase) displayed by the state violates the
Establishment Clause.157 Furthermore, the size of the text on a display
may shed light on the display’s purpose and may affect the
determination of whether the display is constitutional.158 As the United
States Supreme Court has noted, it must be determined whether the
display is merely passive in its use or actively confronts the passersby.159
With regard to Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates, the “In God
We Trust” language is placed on Indiana’s state-issued license plates that
many motorists see regularly.160 The words on the Indiana license plates,
Indeed, in Marsh itself, the Court recognized that not even the “unique
history” of legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative
prayers that have the effect of affiliating the government with any one
specific faith or belief. The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did
not violate this principle because the particular chaplain had “removed
all references to Christ.” Thus, Marsh plainly does not stand for the
sweeping proposition . . . that all accepted practices 200 years old and
their equivalents are constitutional today. Nor can Marsh, given its
facts and its reasoning, compel the conclusion that the display of the
crèche involved in this lawsuit is constitutional. . . .
The history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains numerous
examples
of
official
acts
that
endorsed
Christianity
specifically. . . . Whatever else the Establishment Clause may
mean . . . it certainly means at the very least that government may not
demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed (including a
preference for Christianity over other religions).
Id. at 603–04 (citations omitted).
156
259 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001).
157
Id. at 778. The original Ten Commandments display was erected in the 1950s and
resembled the monument in Van Orden; this original monument was destroyed in 1991,
and it was the replacement monument that was at issue in this litigation. Id. at 768. The
court described in detail the visual make-up of the monument and noted that the
monument also contained other documents like the state constitution and Bill of Rights. Id.
at 769. The monument was placed on the statehouse grounds among several other
monuments recognizing things such as Indiana women, civil engineers, and Civil War
history. Id. As the 1991 monument significantly differed from the original display, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the purpose behind the original display
would not transfer to the 1991 version. Id. at 771. The court determined that, contextually,
nothing appeared to detract from the monument’s religious message because there was no
unifying theme linking the other displays. Id. at 773.
158
Id. at 772–73. The Seventh Circuit closely scrutinized the size of the text on the Ten
Commandments monument, which was one inch larger than the other documents on the
display, and noted that it was highly visible to a passerby and that it drew attention to its
religious message, leading to its unconstitutional fate. Id.
159
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
160
See Bureau of Motor Vehicles Website, http://www.in.gov/bmv/4645.htm (last
visited Feb. 8, 2009) (displaying the “In God We Trust” license plate for a visual look at the
design of the Indiana “In God We Trust” plate).
Cf. Plateshack,
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particularly “God” and “Trust[,]” occupy a prominent position.161
Moreover, unlike the situation in Van Orden, in which the monument of
the Ten Commandments was surrounded by several other secular
monuments representing the state’s diverse history, the message on
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate is not surrounded by
numerous other secular items, displays, or messages that detract from
the potentially religious message on the license plate. Moreover, the
plate does not contain any explanation that “In God We Trust” is the
national motto.162
When the phrase “In God We Trust” is considered in conjunction
with the history and purpose surrounding the enactment of the “In God
We Trust” plates in Indiana, the constitutionality of these plates becomes
even less clear.163 The Court’s recent decision in McCreary appears to
revive Lemon’s focus on the purpose behind the display, thereby
designating purpose as a critical factor in assessing governmental
displays of religious messages.164 The McCreary court emphasized that
http://www.plateshack.com/y2k/Tennessee/tn2007eagle.jpg (last visited Nov. 10, 2007)
(showing Tennessee’s plate with “In God We Trust” on it). A portion of the money
collected from people purchasing the Bald Eagle specialty license plate went to a
foundation that raises money for protection of the bald eagle.
Id.
See
http://www.eagles.org/ for more information.
161
See supra note 160.
Compare Bureau of Motor Vehicles Website,
http://www.in.gov/bmv/4645.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (displaying a picture of
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate, pictured below, to show the font size of “God”
and “Trust” in the “In God We Trust” motto), with The Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life, http://pewforum.org/assets/images/in-god-we-trust_large.jpg (last visited Feb. 8,
2009) (displaying a picture of the back of a twenty dollar bill, pictured below, to show the
uniformity of the font of all of the words in the “In God We Trust” motto).

162
See ACLU Neb. Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 778–81 (8th Cir.
2005), rev’g en banc, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004) (Bye & Arnold, JJ., dissenting) (discussing
that an Establishment Clause challenge should not be decided based on a simple passage of
time, mathematical formula, or a basic consideration of history and tradition).
163
See infra notes 164–80.
164
See supra note 60 and accompanying text. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1202
(noting that in Van Orden the Court used the symbolic endorsement test to uphold the
monument display, while in McCreary the Court used the Lemon test to strike down the
monument display). Justice Souter defended the purpose prong of Lemon, despite its harsh
critics on the Court, when he stressed that the prong was the very foundation of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 1203; see also Schaps, supra note 67, at 1249
(noting that the decision by the Court in McCreary relied heavily on the purpose prong of
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courts must investigate “readily discoverable fact[s],” including the
legislative history of the display, the sequence of events leading up to the
enactment of the display, and comments made by the sponsor of the
display.165 Moreover, the reasonable observer need not “turn a blind eye
Lemon). See generally McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU., 545 U.S. 844, 886–93 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (when deciding Establishment Clause cases, Justice Scalia often relies on, as he
did in Van Orden, the history and tradition of the Founding Fathers to validate the
challenged practice, whether it is legislative prayer or governmental displays). In
McCreary, in support of an accommodationist position, Justice Scalia noted that when the
Founding Fathers referenced God or the Creator, they presumably spoke of a monotheistic
God. Id. at 894. Justice Scalia has also often suggested that some members of the Court
desire to take religion out of the public sphere altogether, but he recanted this in a story he
told while in Europe the day after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Id. at 885. He noted that
a European judge commented to him after hearing President Bush’s television address to
the nation, in which the President ended by saying “God bless America,” that the judge
wished his head of state could espouse similar sentiments during a national tragedy, but
was forbidden from doing so because of the strict separation of church and state in many
Western European countries. Id. at 885–86. But see supra note 19 (referring to Justice
Brennan’s quote in Abington Sch. Dist).
While Justice Scalia’s positions on the
Establishment Clause are reasonable and may very well be the case, Justice Brennan aptly
articulated that the diverse mix of religions and irreligion in this country was not likely
considered in 1787. supra note 19. Although a strict separation approach may alleviate
some of the confusing decisions handed down by the Supreme Court because it would
provide a clearer approach—similar to Justice Scalia’s neutral law of general applicability
approach to the Free Exercise clause in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)—
this Note is not suggesting that any public, governmental reference to God must be
stricken. This Note merely suggests that the muddled jurisprudence of the Court has quite
possibly permitted Indiana to find a loophole in the Court’s reasoning by permitting
suspicious motivations because of perceived legitimate methods.
165
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862–63. As the Court noted, “A secret motive stirs up no strife
and does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, and it suffices to wait and see
whether such government action turns out to have (as it may even be likely to have) the
illegitimate effect of advancing religion.” Id. at 863. If an objective observer, aware of the
history and other events surrounding the enactment of the display, did not perceive a
religious message, then the endorsing concern is essentially eliminated. Id.; see also ACLU
v. Rowan Cty., 513 F. Supp. 2d 889, 902 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (noting other considerations that a
court can evaluate when deciphering the purpose behind the governmental display). But
see McCreary, 545 U.S. at 900–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing strongly the majority in
McCreary for exploring the purpose and the legislative history behind a challenged law). In
McCreary, Justice Scalia noted that the majority manipulated Lemon’s basic requirements to
fit the outcome they desired. Id. at 900. Justice Scalia questioned the majority’s use of the
reasonable observer and wondered why a law could be found unconstitutional because of
what a reasonable person would think of a display even though the display could have a
purely secular purpose. Id. at 900–01. Furthermore, Justice Scalia inquired about the
Court’s shifting demands for the secular purpose when reviewing a challenged display
claiming, “the Court replaces Lemon’s requirement that the government have ‘a
secular . . . purpose,’ with the heightened requirement that the secular purpose
‘predominate’ over any purpose to advance religion.” Id. at 901–02 (citations omitted). See
also Antony Barone Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s Neighborhood”: A Home for Minority Religions?, 81
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 819, 819–21 (2007) (discussing Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the
Establishment Clause and his influence over the Court). The article noted that, if given the

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 9

1356 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

to the context in which [a] . . . [display] arose.”166 The McCreary Court
noted that, although a display could violate Lemon’s purpose prong
because its history manifests a sectarian purpose, another display—
similar in content, but lacking such historical sectarian purpose—could
be deemed constitutional.167 “[I]t is appropriate that [displays] be
treated differently, for . . . one display . . . [may] be properly understood
as demonstrating a preference for one group of religious believers as
against another.”168 Such is indeed the case with Indiana’s “In God We
Trust” plates.
The statements Representative Burton made regarding the “In God
We Trust” plates, and the context in which he made them, strongly
suggest that his intent was to promote religion.169 According to the
Indiana House of Representatives-Republican Caucus, Representative
Burton stated,
“We put this bill forward so that our citizens could
express their belief regardless of their religious
background[.]” . . . “This license plate reflects Hoosiers'
faith and values[] . . . . Because this is nondenominational, Hoosiers will pay for the cost to
chance, Justice Scalia would likely replace the Lemon test with the actual coercion test. Id. at
831–35. However, the Court in McCreary highlighted various decisions where the Court
did require a heightened secular purpose. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859–60 n.9.
166
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 866 n.14.
169
See H.B. 1029, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005) (proposing “In God We Trust”
license plates for Indiana motorists); see also H.B. 1013, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2006) (proposing the current version of the “In God We Trust” license plates); H.B. 1189,
114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005) (proposing an “In God We Trust” sticker to be
placed on license plates for a fee of twenty-five dollars); H.B. 1279, 113th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2003) (proposing an “In God We Trust” license plate that the legislature did not
ultimately authorize). See Hoosier Values at the Statehouse, Vol. 1 Issue 1 (May 9, 2006)
(noting that various faith-based groups have been working on the design for the “In God
We Trust” license plate). The article emphasized faith and values for Indiana residents and
appeared alongside other faith-based topics. Id. Governor Daniels, referring to the “In
God We Trust” plates, stated, “Our Constitution restricts the establishment of religion, it
does not require the absence of it.” Id. See Huffstutter, supra note 11, at 14 (noting that
originally there was contention as to what the funds recovered from the “In God We Trust”
license plates would be used for, whether these funds would go to religious groups, and
whether the license plates violated the Establishment Clause; thus, Representative Burton
must have strategically avoided these issues by categorizing the plates as standard plates
rather than specialty plates). An interesting question is that if these plates are purely
intended to promote our national heritage, then why should there be any discussion or fear
on the part of Representative Burton as to where the funds would go? See Bradner, supra
note 74, at A3 (perhaps one State Representative wondered this as well when he voted “no”
to the license plate because he felt it “pander[ed] to the religious[]”).
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produce the plate and there will be no money going to
any specific organization. . . . As our new Governor
said[,] ‘we are a state of people who speak plainly,’
that’s what those who purchase this plate are doing.’170
Similar comments were made in McCreary by a pastor, who
accompanied one of his parishioners, the Judge-Executive, at the
courthouse ceremony where the Ten Commandments were unveiled.171
The pastor stated that the Ten Commandments represented a “creed of
ethics[,]” and that displaying them was “one of the greatest things the
judge could have done to close out the millennium.”172 Even though
various members of the Court have made conflicting statements
regarding the precise standard required by Lemon’s purpose prong, the
majority in McCreary explained that the secular purpose of a display
must be both sincere and genuine.173 Both the legislative history and the
See Indiana House of Representative-Republican Caucus, http://www.in.gov/
legislative/house_republicans/thisweek/index050121.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
Representative Burton also claimed that, “[w]ith this proposal, there is no fiscal impact to
the state. If the bill makes it out of the Indiana Senate and approved by the Governor, it
will be available for purchase beginning January 1, 2006. Any license holder may apply to
purchase the ‘In God We Trust’ plate.” Id.
171
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851 (noting that the county legislative body issued an order
“requiring the display [to] be posted in a very high traffic area of the courthouse[]”)
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
172
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851. See also supra note 38 (discussing the display of a picture of
Representative Burton presenting a ceremonial license plate to his pastor at a ceremony
marking the distribution of the new license plate). This appears similar to the hanging
ceremony of the Ten Commandments display that was at issue in McCreary. 545 U.S. at
851.
173
See supra note 60 and accompanying text. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 (1993) (Scalia and Thomas, J.J., concurring)
(Justice Scalia, a vocal critic of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, has led a
spirited crusade to abandon Lemon’s three-pronged test). Justice Scalia’s disgust for the
Lemon test was humorously captured when he wrote:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again[] . . .
[t]he secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to
kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish to do so,
but we can command it to return to the tomb at will.
Id. at 398–99. Lamb’s Chapel involved a school district that had denied a local evangelical
church the ability to use school facilities after normal hours to show a series of films, which
focused on child rearing and Christian values. Id. at 387–89. The Court held that the school
district’s actions violated the public forum doctrine, and permitting the films to be shown
did not violate the Establishment Clause, nor did it offend Lemon’s three-part test. Id. at
390–95. Justice Scalia’s concurrence criticized the Court’s invocation of the Lemon test as
misguided. Id. at 399–400 (stating, “I will decline to apply Lemon—whether it validates or
invalidates the government action in question . . . .”). Justice Scalia is a strong advocate for
170
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purpose behind the enactment of a display must be considered when
assessing the actual effect of the display.174
Said differently, a
theoretically legitimate end should not be accomplished by
impermissible means; therefore, it is not only important to consider the
display itself, but also the content and history of the display.175
Similarly, under Justice O’Connor’s modified Lemon test, sometimes
referred to as the Endorsement test, a reasonable observer in Indiana
might regard Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates as carrying a
religious message, not merely the national motto.176 Significantly, as the
Court in McCreary explained, “reasonable observers have reasonable
memories,” and a reasonable Indiana citizen is unlikely to forget the
controversy surrounding the purpose of a particular governmental
display.177 Indeed, the reaction by the public to the religious overtones
of Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates is evidenced in the
numerous newspaper and internet-based articles and commentary
accompanying these articles.178 For instance, one person who purchased

abandoning the Lemon test in Establishment Clause challenges due to its unmanageable
standards and inconsistent application. See id.
174
See supra Parts III.A.1, IV.A (discussing Justice Breyer’s approach in Van Orden).
175
See supra Part III (referring to McCreary and the county’s efforts to find a secular
purpose for the Ten Commandment’s display through its continual transformations).
176
See supra note 10; see also Taking Down Words: In God We Trust: New License Plates
Are As Popular As Predicted Last Year, http://www.takingdownwords.com/
taking_down_words/2007/01/in_god_we_trust.html#comment-27442014 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2007) (posting comments on a blog that highlight the reaction by the public to
these plates; most see it as making a religious statement).
177
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 (noting that “[its] precedents sensibly forbid an observer ‘to
turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose[]’”) (second alteration in
original). Moreover, the Court emphasized that “purpose matters[]” and that “it will
matter to objective observers whether posting the Commandments follows on the heels of
displays motivated by sectarianism, or whether [the display] lacks a history demonstrating
that purpose.” Id. at 866 n.14.
178
See generally Northwest Indiana Times: ‘In God We Trust’ Motto Still Causes Debate,
http://www.nwitimes.com/articles/2007/10/01/news/top_news/docb2b32b03ca4d304f8
6257366007e1c1d.txt (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (posting numerous comments by local
citizens which revealed the overwhelming religious sentiments and reactions to the use of
the motto on Indiana’s plates). The following comments were taken from people posting
remarks on the website after the article was published: “Plain and Simple. People of ALL
faiths should be respected, and should those with no faith. The government must be here
to help and service all of us, not just a certain group. In doing so, they must remail [sic]
NEUTRAL on religious belives [sic] and not support anyone belief system.” Id. While
another person said, “Hey, if you donnn’t [sic] like the phrase ‘In GOD We Trust’ on your
license plate, buy a vanity plate. I personally trust in God[,]” and another person titled
“More Christians than you think” wrote, “I believe in God but was disappointed when I
renewed my registration online and was NOT given the option of obtaining one of these
plates. So, there would be a lot more of these plates riding around. Do any of the gang
members have these plates?” Id.
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an “In God We Trust” license plate stated, “You know, I just like the idea
of going with one that talks about God[] . . . . Besides, it’s cheaper [than
a specialty license plate] and that’s what really sells me on it.”179 Yet, as
the Court in Allegheny suggested, the government may not favor any
religion over irreligion, even a monotheistic, non-denominational
religion.180
2.

Coercion: Safety in Numbers?

As Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates become more
common, public acceptance of the plate gains strength.181 To be sure,
although Indiana motorists are not being forced into choosing the “In
God We Trust” license plate, implicit coercion may be more likely to
occur as the plates become more popular.182 The proliferation of “In God
We Trust” plates may leave certain segments of society feeling as though
they are outsiders and not part of the popular group.183 Further, some
anecdotal evidence shows that Bureau of Motor Vehicle (“BMV”)
employees, at least initially, suggestively favored the “In God We Trust”
license plate over the standard plate to its customers.184 This would have
resulted in some individuals, who were visiting the BMV to receive their
new license plates, being forced to speak by disclosing their opposition
to the plate’s message to the BMV employees, thereby casting themselves
as outsiders and not within the favored group.185

Huffstutter, supra note 11, at 14.
Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 593–97 (1989). The
government cannot promote or support religious messages by religious organizations
either. Id. at 600. See supra notes 176–79 (Thus, the use of “In God We Trust” on Indiana’s
license plates could at the very least be viewed as promoting religion in general, even if a
particular God is not explicitly named).
181
See Inside Indiana Business, http://www.insideindianabusiness.com/newsitem.asp?
ID=24744 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that more than one million “In God We Trust”
license plates have filled Indiana roadways). Representative Burton stated, “I am proud
that the people of Indiana are standing up for our nation’s motto and choosing the ‘In God
We Trust’ license plate[] . . . . Even though some people are challenging the word ‘special’
surrounding the alternative license plate, the only thing that is truly special about this plate
is that people want to display it.” Id. See supra notes 12-14 (discussing the mixed messages
as to whether the Indiana “In God We Trust” plate is a specialty plate or an alternative
regular plate).
182
See supra note 181.
183
See Furthermore, supra note 6, at 12A (asking if drivers are beginning to “wonder if you
might be the last driver without an ‘In God We Trust’ license plate?”).
184
See Brander, supra note 74, at A3 (noting that there have been confirmed allegations
that some BMV employees have pushed the plates upon motorists).
185
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (recognizing that the First Amendment
“includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all[]”).
179
180
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Similarly, various psychological studies show that dissemination by
the government of a perceived religious message can change the
attitudes of people.186 However, even Solomon Asch, the experimenter
who conducted the line studies, recognized that the theory of group
norms has its limits.187 It is true that Indiana citizens can express their
displeasure with the “In God We Trust” license plates in a variety of
ways, which could counter the effect that a perceived group adherence
may have.188 But this situation necessarily forces citizens to speak, which
violates the principle established in Wooley that inherent in the First
Amendment is “the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all.”189 Just as the Court has cautioned against disseminating
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, the court should also
acknowledge the powerful psychological impact of group norms and the
desire by individuals to adhere to a collective message.190
B. An Analytical Reflection: A Taxing Approach
Throughout their history, license plates were used merely to identify
the cars with their owners.191 Today, the license plate has moved well
beyond the simple alphanumeric combination on a plain-colored
background toward a mobile billboard of sorts that carries a message for

186
Manohar, supra note 76, at 236 (listing three cues that the government can use to better
effectuate its message). One of the cues mentioned deals with pure numbers noting that
“[t]he government can increase the persuasiveness of its speech by enlisting multiple,
ostensibly independent agents . . . to send its message.” Id. Another cue that is present in
Indiana’s situation is popularity because “[i]f the government uses private speakers to
make its message seem more popular than it actually is . . . it can increase the
persuasiveness of that message.” Id.
187
PAICHELER, supra note 85, at 88.
188
Manohar, supra note 76, at 235 (noting that drivers could place bumper stickers on
their cars or utilize other means to display their opposition, thus keeping the public
discourse open to their ideas). Likewise, Indiana motorists can let their voice be heard
through editorial columns, as some have done, or by not choosing the plate altogether. See
generally id.
189
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
190
See supra notes 181–89. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1226–27 (discussing the
government’s interactions with religion and the premise of ceremonial deism).
Chemerinsky pointed to the factors highlighted by Justice O’Connor that would guide
courts as to whether government interactions would be deemed ceremonial deism or a
violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.
191
See Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, http://www.in.gov/bmv/vote/history/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2007) (discussing the history of Indiana license plates with illustrative
pictures showing the progression of the design of the “In God We Trust” plate). Cf.
Massachusetts RMV Website, http://www.mass.gov/rmv/history/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 10, 2007) (discussing the history of license plates in general and, specifically, in
Massachusetts).
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almost any interest a person desires.192 This Section explores the
collision of compelled subsidies jurisprudence and Indiana’s “In God We
Trust” license plates, and the mixture of government and private speech
that results.193
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate presents a unique conflict
because it contains elements of Bredesen and Rose.194 In particular, the
plate has been designated by Indiana’s BMV as both an alternative
regular plate and a no-fee specialty plate.195 Although the circuit courts
in Bredesen and Rose focused on whether the states had engaged in
viewpoint discrimination, the analysis used by both courts highlights the
complexity involved in determining the speaker with regard to the
message on a license plate.196 As the dissent in Bredesen aptly noted, to
view a license plate as purely government speech would oversimplify
the situation.197 The Southern District Court of West Virginia, in West
Virginia Ass’n of Club Owners and Fraternal Services, Inc. v. Musgrave,198
acknowledged the lack of guidance from the Court in Johanns in
determining “when the government is speaking and when it is

192
See Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, supra note 191 (noting that Indiana developed
specialty plates in 1977 and that currently, in Indiana, there are over 75 specialty plates
available to choose from for an extra cost). See also Massachusetts RMV Website,
http://www.mass.gov/rmv/history/index.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that in
1993, Massachusetts issued a high number of specialty plates).
193
See infra Part III.B.
194
See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (discussing differences between
government and private speech in the context of license plates).
195
See Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles:
Indiana’s License Plate,
http://www.in.gov/bmv/plates/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that the
“In God We Trust” license plate is a “‘no-fee’ specialty plate”); BMV Unveils ‘In God We
Trust’ License Plate Design, http://www.insideindianabusiness.com/newsitem.asp?ID=
19174 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that “[n]o additional fee [beyond the standard
charge] will be enforced for purchase of the [“In God We Trust”] plate, as is the case with
all other specialty license plates[]”). But see H.B. 1013, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2006) (stating in the bill that “it is not a special group recognition license plate[]”); Indiana
Bureau of Motor Vehicles: Indiana’s License Plate, http://www.in.gov/bmv/
platesandtitles/plates/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that this is the “state’s first
alternative regular plate”).
196
See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (noting that the Bredesen and Rose courts
dealt with “Choose Life” specialty plates and determined whether the respective states
engaged in viewpoint discrimination when permitting various pro-life organizations to
create them).
197
ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380–85 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boyce, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
198
512 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D. W.Va. 2007) (granting a preliminary motion, and concluding
that a ban on limited video lottery advertising regulated private speech).
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regulating private speech.”199 The district court synthesized other cases
to reach its conclusion.200
The Musgrave court articulated four guiding principles, which have
developed from Johanns and other government speech cases.201 First,
speech is more likely to be government speech if the message asserts an
“overarching message.”202
Second, speech is more likely to be
government speech if the government asserts a high “degree of
control . . . over its purported message[.]”203 Third, speech is more likely
to be government speech when the government funds the activity at
issue or provides a benefit.204 Fourth, speech is more likely to be
government speech when the government asserts a particular “rationale
for insulating [itself] from normal First Amendment scrutiny when it is
speaking[.]”205 To resolve the complexity of who is speaking—the
government or private citizens—the Musgrave court then adopted the
four-factor test elucidated in Rose.206 The Musgrave court noted that this
four-factor test was consistent with the decision in Johanns and that, in
certain situations, the speech occurring can be both government and
private, as was the case in Rose.207 Therefore, even after Johanns, Rose’s
four-factor test is best equipped to handle the conflicting speech that
appears on license plates, especially specialized plates that bear a
message.208
Applying this four-factor test to the “In God We Trust” license plates
produces a mixed result.209 The central purpose behind the “In God We
Trust” plate presents a fascinating problem, in part because of

Id. at 432.
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id. (emphasizing that in such cases the government would be politically accountable
for its message).
206
Id. at 435. The district court focused on the “level of control [that] the government can
exercise over the content of the speech.” Id. at 430. If the government is speaking, it can
select and tailor its message as it sees fit, whereas if the government engages in private
speech, it is limited. Id. The Musgrave court also discussed in detail the government speech
that was at issue in Rust, which was found permissible. Id. at 430–31. The Musgrave court
concluded that the rationale behind allowing government speech to occur, as in Rust and
other cases, was because the electorate can hold the speakers accountable if they do not like
the message and use the ballot box in future elections to change the message. Id. at 431.
207
Id. at 433.
208
See Choose Life Illinois, Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863–64 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that
the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor test remains applicable when dealing with license plates).
209
See infra notes 210–21 (describing the application of the four-factor test to Indiana’s
plates).
199
200
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Representative Burton’s mixed statements regarding the plate’s creation
and the public reaction to its alleged purpose.210 Although Indiana likely
wants to be identified as the speaker of the plate’s message so that the
reasoning set forth in Johanns would apply—precluding a First
Amendment challenge—if the government was identified as promoting
a religious message, this could result in an Establishment Clause
problem.211 The first element of the four-factor test—whether the
government asserts an overarching message—more likely cuts in favor
of government speech because the state was trying to promote a message
as evidenced by Representative Burton’s statements.212 Similarly, the
second factor of editorial control more likely cuts in favor of government
speech because the message on Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license
plate originated in the state legislature, and although private faith-based
groups aided in crafting the design of the plate, the government
maintained final editorial control.213 Similar to the facts and reasoning in
Rose, where the South Carolina license plate originated with the state and
the legislature chose the “Choose Life” message, Indiana too would
likely be found as the creator of the message displayed on its “In God
We Trust” plates.214
210
See supra notes 37, 176–78 and accompanying text. See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d
at 433 (indicating that an important consideration related to the first factor of Rose’s fourfactor test in determining whether speech is government or private is whether the
government seeks to raise revenue or promote its message).
211
See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1 (presenting various court cases and their respective
reasoning as it relates to when a government display of religious symbols violates the
Establishment Clause and when the government is impermissibly compelling a subsidy).
212
See supra note 210.
213
See supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that Tennessee maintained editorial
control over the “Choose Life” plate in Bredesen).
214
See supra note 133 and accompanying text (referencing the factual scenario in Rose,
where the state maintained primary control over the content of its “Choose Life” message
leading the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to find that the second factor of the four-factor
test weighed in favor of South Carolina). See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 433–34
(noting that the second factor is relevant only when the government promotes its message
or when the government’s central purpose of its message is unclear). If the central purpose
is unclear—as it may be with the “In God We Trust” license plates—then the second factor
of the test, editorial control, may shed light on the central purpose analysis used when
determining the first factor. Id. at 434. “There is a correlation between the presence of a
programmatic message and whether the second [ . . . ] factor favors a finding of
government or private speech. When courts determine that the first [ . . . ] factor favors a
finding of government speech, they usually also find that the second [ . . . ] factor weighs in
favor of government speech, and vice versa.” Id. at 437. The Musgrave court noted that if,
however, the government promotes a message, then the remaining three factors are to be
considered in determining whether the government’s message may be attributed to a
private speaker. Id. The court noted that finding government speech based on the second
factor helped prevent the message from being attributed to private speakers, in which case
the government does not have to identify itself as the speaker. Id. at 436–37. The court
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However, with regard to the third factor of this four-factor test—the
identity of the speaker—the private owner would be the speaker because
the plate is on the private owner’s vehicle and the private owner chose to
display the message.215 As the district court in Musgrave concluded, “It is
not difficult to think of situations where the owner of an item is different
from the person speaking about the item.”216 The court noted that the
technical ownership of the item, in Indiana’s case a license plate, was not
always outcome determinative, but instead it was “ownership of the
means of communication that was important.”217 Thus, the third factor
cuts in favor of private speech because most people would likely identify
the speaker to be the vehicle owner.218 Similarly, the fourth factor—who
bears the ultimate responsibility for the speech—weighs in favor of the
private individual, even if not as heavily, for the same rationale as the
third factor.219 However, unlike in Rose where South Carolina charged a
fee to display the “Choose Life” plates, Indiana does not charge a fee to
display the “In God We Trust” plates.220 Nonetheless, applying the
stated, “First Amendment issues may arise, however, when viewers identify government
speech as private speech.” Id. at 437.
215
See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (noting that specialty license plates are
often identified with the drivers and owners of vehicles). See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d
at 434 (stressing that although the Court in Johanns did not address the third and fourth
factors, it did not foreclose the use of these factors in future cases). The district court,
taking its guidance from the Supreme Court, cautioned against reading the principles in
Rust too broadly. Id.
216
Id. at 437.
217
Id. at 434.
218
See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (discussing the four-factor test used by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rose). See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 437
(stating, “common sense suggests that the LVL [limited video lottery] retailers are the
literal speakers when their own business names are at issue. Similarly, passersby who
view limited video lottery advertising will likely assume that the private establishment
doing the advertising is the speaker, not the State of West Virginia[]”). These situations
parallel that of a license plate displayed on a motorist’s car.
219
See supra note 134 (discussing specifically the third and fourth factors of the four part
test used in Rose). See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (cautioning that simply because
the state creates the existence of the item in question does not always make it responsible
for the speech put forth by private parties on that item). The district court noted that
simply because the state legalized the video lottery machines and was responsible for their
existence did not mean the state was responsible for the speech put forth by the private
LVL retailers on these machines. Id. If this premise were true, then the fourth factor
“would always favor the government because the government can always be held
responsible for its regulatory decisions.” Id.
220
See supra notes 6, 121 (noting that no additional fee is charged for choosing the “In
God We Trust” license plate). See supra notes 121–22 (noting that the dissent in Bredesen
suggested that the compelled subsidy doctrine would apply if no fee were charged to
individuals who selected the specialty license plates). However, even under Johanns, the
question of who is speaking would still need to be determined, and in the context of license
plates, it appears that the four-factor test set-forth by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
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Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, Indiana’s license plates appear to carry mixed
speech by both the government and the private vehicle owner.221
Because Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates likely constitute
mixed speech, the next issue to be decided is whether this mixture
amounts to a compelled subsidy.222 A complication arises here because
the message on a license plate is not easily identified with the
government.223 If private speech is occurring, then Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education224 should control the analysis, leading to the conclusion that
a compelled subsidy, in theory, is taking place because the state is
forcing taxpayers to pay for a private message with which they
disagree.225 However, the Court’s expanding definition of government
speech, and its continued erosion of taxpayer standing to challenge these
claims, especially after Hein v. Religious Freedom Foundation,226 may
prohibit such an action.227 Therefore, although a compelled subsidy
claim might be actionable, unless a citizen of Indiana could demonstrate
a sufficient emotional injury, his claim may be barred by the doctrines of
taxpayer standing and generalized grievances.228

Rose is the best tool for managing the complexities involved in addressing who is speaking.
supra note 140.
221
See supra notes 209–20 and accompanying text.
222
See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text.
223
See infra Parts IV.A.–B. (noting the Court’s statement in Wooley that a license plate can
serve as a mobile billboard). See generally supra notes 220–22 (suggesting that Indiana’s “In
God We Trust” plates seem to interplay the analysis of Johanns, but as explained above, the
Fourth Circuit’s four-factored test seems better-equipped than Johanns pure government
speech doctrine to analyze the issue).
224
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
225
Id. at 234–35 (recognizing that a person “should be free to believe as he will, and that
in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than
coerced by the State[]”). The Court referenced James Madison’s sentiments, “Who does not
see . . . [t]hat the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of
his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any
other establishment in all cases whatsoever?” Id. at 234 n.31. However, in the past,
taxpayers have subsidized copies of prayers that were collected and published in books for
distribution to legislative members and nonmembers. See Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d
228, 235 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
226
Hein v. Religious Freedom Found., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2568 (2007).
227
See supra notes 33, 130 (discussing Hinrichs and the proposition that there is still a
possible cause of action pursuant to the compelled subsidy doctrine if it can be shown that
a person is affected emotionally by exposure to the license plate).
228
See supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text.
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IV. PROPOSED COURT ANALYSIS: MCCREARY SUGGESTS THAT CONTEXT AND
PURPOSE MATTER IN ESTABLISHMENT CASES, AND WHO IS SPEAKING—
GOVERNMENT OR INDIVIDUAL—DETERMINES COMPELLED SUBSIDIES
The problem with Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates is that,
through them, Indiana appears to be on the cusp of violating both the
Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy doctrines, but the plates
nonetheless may escape invalidation.229 The crux of the problem
emerges from the alleged purpose behind the plates and its coercive
consequences; more particularly, the plate not only contains a religious
message that is viewed as endorsing religion, but it also forces citizens of
Indiana who disagree with the message to pay for other private citizens
to display it.230 To avoid such a capricious outcome, this Note proposes
that courts should adopt the six interpretative tools, articulated by
Justice Breyer in Van Orden and McCreary, as a more nuanced approach
to address an Establishment Clause challenge to Indiana’s “In God We
Trust” plates if one were brought or in cases similar to it.231
Furthermore, courts should apply Rose’s four-factor test when dealing
with a mixed speech issue, which here resulted from the message on
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates.232 Such analysis leads to the
conclusion that Indiana’s “In God We Trust” plate, in its current form, is
unconstitutional.233
229
See infra notes 230–33 (discussing the Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy
complications surrounding Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates and its
unconstitutionality as currently administered). See generally McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU,
545 U.S. 844 (2005). Such a danger was reflected by both Jefferson when he “refused to
issue Thanksgiving Proclamations because he believed that they violated the
Constitution[,]” and Madison when he “criticized Virginia’s general assessment tax not just
because it required people to donate ‘three pence’ to religion, but because ‘it is itself a
signal of persecution. It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions
in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.’” Id. at 878.
230
See supra Part III.
231
See infra Part IV.A.
232
See supra note 208 (referencing the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals holding in Choose
Life Ill., Inc that Rose’s four factored test is still appropriate when dealing with speech issues
and license plates). See also supra notes 96, 116–20 (Such analysis would still permit a
finding that would be consistent with the doctrine of government speech expounded in
Johanns). If the “In God We Trust” license plate were the sole official plate of the state and
the only one available to residents at no extra cost, then the third and fourth factors would
weigh more heavily to finding government speech because the government would more
likely be affiliated as the literal speaker. Supra notes 116–20. Furthermore, the government
would bear more of the direct responsibility for the speech because a driver would not
have, in effect, the same choice as Indiana residents currently do. Supra notes 116–20.
233
See supra notes 19–21 (putting forth the proposed analysis a court should use if
considering a law suit regarding Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates on
Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy grounds). See generally McCreary, 545 U.S. at
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A. Navigating the Establishment Clause Waters: Purpose, Perception, and
Precedent
Due to complex factual scenarios frequently presented to courts in
Establishment Clause challenges and the tenuous balancing of free
exercise, freedom of expression, and freedom of association concerns that
often occurs, this Note proposes that Justice Breyer’s six interpretative
tools would be the most effective and pragmatic method for analyzing
religious displays by the government and whether Indiana’s “In God We
Trust” plates violate the Establishment Clause.234 Justice Breyer applies
his interpretive “tools” when reviewing litigation before the Court; he
considers the text of the statute (or in this case the content of the display),
history, tradition, precedent, the purpose of a statute (or here the
purpose of the display), and the consequences of the law (or display).235
His method incorporates the various perspectives of the Court—
separation, neutrality, and accommodation—while at the same time
combining the three Establishment Clause tests of Lemon, endorsement,
and coercion.236 Its application to Indiana’s “In God We Trust” plate
would likely render the plate unconstitutional.
If McCreary is not an aberration, then Indiana’s “In God We Trust”
license plate likely violates the Establishment Clause because it lacks the
908 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Post McCreary, where the majority sorted through the changing
displays of the two Kentucky Courthouses, revealing the creators’ underlying religious
purpose, it seems as though Indiana has found a way to move through the Court’s
jurisprudence seemingly undetected). Justice Scalia cautioned the Court of this fallacy
when he stated,
Displays erected in silence (and under the direction of good legal
advice) are permissible, while those hung after discussion and debate
are deemed unconstitutional. Reduction of the Establishment Clause
to such minutiae trivializes the Clause’s protection against religious
establishment; indeed, it may inflame religious passions by making the
passing comments of every government official the subject of endless
litigation.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234
See supra Parts II.A.1, III.A.1 (presenting Justice Breyer’s analysis, used when deciding
Establishment Clause cases, and discussing how Justice Breyer utilizes his six interpretative
tools to determine whether an Establishment Clause violation exists).
235
See Lithwick, supra note 19. Lithwick’s article discussed the debate between Justices
Breyer and Scalia on Constitutional theory and their differing interpretations of how to
analyze a case on review. Id. Justice Breyer claimed the Court would be misguided to not
include the last two parts of his interpretive method, while Justice Scalia considered these
last two parts too subjective and misleading. Id. Justice Breyer proclaimed that if only
Constitutional truths mattered, then the Court should have nine historians instead of
lawyers, to which Justice Scalia countered that such a scenario is better than having nine
ethicists deciding the Constitutional fate of a case on his or her personal whim. Id.
236
See supra Parts II.A.1–2 and accompanying text (discussing various Establishment
Clause cases and the analyses utilized by the courts in each case discussed).
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required secular purpose and is therefore viewed as endorsing
religion.237 Although the text of the statute that authorized the creation
of the plates does not contain a blatant religious statement, the State of
Indiana endorses religion by not charging a fee for the “In God We
Trust” plate like it charges for other specialty plates.238 Just as the Ten
Commandments could be displayed in either a sectarian or non-sectarian
manner, this Note contends that the same argument can be made for the
national motto, especially as used on Indiana’s license plate.239 Similarly,
while the tradition and history of the phrase “In God We Trust” itself has
become more secularized through the passage of time, it lacks any
tradition of being placed on a license plate.240 In fact, in line with stare
decisis, judicial precedent established in McCreary suggests that
Representative Burton’s statements and continued efforts to promote the
plates can be interpreted as his desire to advocate his strong religious
convictions. This inference is enhanced when viewed in the wake of
legislative prayer litigation.241 Furthermore, Indiana’s actions lack
See supra notes 59–63 (discussing McCreary and its holding that the displays of the Ten
Commandments were unconstitutional for endorsing religion).
238
See supra notes 6, 169 and accompanying text (referring to the bill’s history and text).
239
See supra note 169. See Anthony Flecker, Comment, Though Shalt Make No Law
Respecting an Establishment of Religion: ACLU v. McCreary County, Van Orden v. Perry, and
the Establishment Clause, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT, 239, 247–49 (2006) (noting that
drawing the distinction between government and private speech is critical in determining
whether the speech is constitutional or violates the Establishment Clause). Flecker further
explored the dynamic of whether speech takes place in a public forum or on private
property. Id. at 248–49.
240
See McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Even Justice Scalia, a member of the Court less likely than other members to find an
Establishment Clause violation, recognized that the Ten Commandments could, depending
on their use, violate the Establishment Clause. Id. See also supra notes 133–36 (applying
Rose’s four-factor test). Therefore, though it may be challenging to persuade the Court to
determine that the National motto—“In God We Trust”—advances a religious message,
this Note contends that, depending on the context in which this motto is used, it may
indeed advance a religious message. Supra notes 133–36. Specifically, when the “In God
We Trust” message appears on license plates, this raises the issue of attribution because a
license plate is not similar to coinage or government buildings that are clearly
representative of the government’s own message. Supra notes 133–36. Moreover, a person
does not “choose” the coins or money that he or she carries in the same way that he or she
“chooses” which license plate to display on his or her vehicle. See supra note 136. See also
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). To be sure, as the Court suggested in Wooley,
a person’s license plate is much more of a private billboard than the coins he or he
possesses. Id. See generally supra note 136. Therefore, when the “In God We Trust”
message appears on an individual’s license plate, it advances a religious message. See
generally supra note 136.
241
See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. See generally McCreary, 545 U.S. at 863
(Nevertheless, although the Court stated that “[a] secret motive stirs up no strife and does
nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, . . .” Representative Burton’s statements may
not leave his intentions completely secret).
237
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judicial precedent: recent court decisions concerning license plates (Rose
and Bredesen) have primarily dealt with viewpoint discrimination
involving the “Choose Life” message—not Establishment Clause
concerns.242
Justice Breyer’s analytical tools provide a workable mode of analysis
that, as demonstrated in McCreary, shed light on the true purpose behind
the “In God We Trust” plates.243 Failure to utilize Justice Breyer’s
analytical “tools” would allow Indiana’s General Assembly to hide
behind their legislative methods to achieve their impermissible ends of
endorsing religion.244 Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates may
not fit neatly into the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
because of the phrase used; however, based on McCreary’s precedent, a
court should find an Establishment Clause violation.245
The “In God We Trust” license plate appears to violate even the
tenets of an accomodationist’s perspective because the actions taken by
the General Assembly appear to be preferential to a particular group at

See supra Part II.B (discussing issues concerning viewpoint discrimination in Bredesen
and Rose).
243
See supra Parts II.A.1, III.A (discussing the analysis Justice Breyer has applied in
various Establishment Clause cases and how his six interpretative tools have contributed to
this analysis).
244
See supra Part III.A (suggesting that Indiana's “In God We Trust” license plates were
created with an impermissible religious purpose). See also supra note 233 (while Justice
Scalia cautions that applying Justice Breyer’s six interpretive tools would cause
government entities to hide their true religious motives—following, of course, the legal
advice rendered by government lawyers—it follows from general criminal law principles
that one is not punished for his or her mere thoughts, but is punished only when those
thoughts are combined with action); supra Part II.A.2 (explaining that verbal expression
combined with actions may create the appearance of endorsement within the community,
leading to the coercive effects that the Establishment Clause is supposed to prohibit); supra
note 58 (referencing Van Orden where Justice Breyer’s concurring vote stressed that the
passage of time without objection and the true purpose behind the display was not to
promote religion).
245
See supra notes 62–63 (discussing McCreary’s holding finding the Ten Commandment
displays in the two Kentucky County Courthouses unconstitutional). The Court’s
muddled Establishment Clause doctrines would likely permit the “In God We Trust”
license plates because McCreary created a potential ambiguity and also because the
composition of the Court has changed since McCreary was decided. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 18, at 1224–25. The changed composition of the Court, with Justice Alito having
replaced Justice O’Connor, likely leaves Justice Kennedy with the deciding vote, and he is
not likely to find an Establishment Cause violation. Id. This Note therefore acknowledges
that the current Court would likely find the “In God We Trust” license plate constitutional,
but contends that such a result should not be the case. Supra notes 62–63 (again suggesting
McCreary’s holding should control a court’s decision regarding the “In God We Trust”
license plates).
242
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the expense of others.246 While the Court has concluded that the
Establishment Clause must differentiate between the “real threat and
mere shadow[,]”247 it must not be forgotten that sometimes lurking in the
shadows are threats more dangerous than those readily apparent.248
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate lacks the required secular
purpose, can be viewed as endorsing religion, and may have
psychologically coercive effects on its citizens; thus, it should be found
unconstitutional.249
B. “Compelling” a Controversy: A Fair Tax, Equitable Results
Similarly, the “In God We Trust” message contained on the license
plates reflects both private and government speech, which is not
embraced by all, yet is being paid for by all taxpayers.250 The Court’s
reasoning in compelled subsidy challenges post-Johanns implies that
messaging rarely will violate the Constitution, provided that any trace of
the government can be found as the speaker, whether the government’s
identification is hidden or not.251 Yet, Indiana’s “In God We Trust”
license plate is dissimilar to government buildings, government-issued
money, or even the only official state plate or flag.252 Unlike these
traditional medium, the Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates are a
far more unique medium, in which the speech that is occurring is mixed,
as the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor test more appropriately
demonstrates.253 Unlike license plates that promote the environment, the
home state university, or other special interests, which are paid for by
those who choose to pay an extra fee to place it on their automobile,
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate is subsidized by taxes of all
residents, whether citizen “A” chose the “In God We Trust” license plate
or not.254

246
But see generally Kolenc, supra note 165 (describing what the world would be like in
Justice Scalia’s neighborhood, as the author phrased it, if Justice Scalia’s views regarding
the Establishment Clause and accommodation of religion were adopted by a majority).
Kolenc’s piece explores the test that Justice Scalia would use in lieu of Lemon’s threepronged approach—the actual coercion test annunciated in Lee. Id. at 831–35. Kolenc
suggested that Justice Scalia’s accomodationist approach would be more protective of and
appealing to minority religions than that of a strict separationist approach. Id. at 836–70.
247
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
248
See supra Part III.A.
249
See supra Part III.A.
250
See supra Part III.B.
251
See supra Part II.B.
252
See supra Part II.B.
253
See supra Part III.B.
254
See supra Part I.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/9

Kulwinski: Trust in God Going Too Far: Indiana's "In God We Trust" License P

2009]

Indiana’s “In God We Trust” License Plates

1371

Given this scenario, some Indiana residents who choose the “In God
We Trust” plate may choose the plate for its religious message, while
others may advocate national pride because the message is the national
motto. Either way, Indiana’s “In God We Trust” plate carries a message
that is affiliated with a private person and is paid for by taxpayers who
may not agree with the message.255 As the Court in Everson stated, “No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”256 These sentiments
should still ring true today. Yet, Flast’s progeny, resulting in the
increasing restrictions on standing, and the recent decision in Johanns,
which expanded the amount of speech falling outside First Amendment
analysis when the government is the speaker, suggest that a compelled
subsidy argument would be unsuccessful.257 Nevertheless, a potentially
impermissible act should not be able to escape judicial scrutiny merely
because of crafty engineering.
Even if “In God We Trust” plates are considered government speech,
the conclusion that government is forcing citizens to subsidize speech
(that some people perceive as containing a religious message) should
lead courts to question the constitutionality of the “In God We Trust”
license plates.258 Furthermore, using the mixed speech analysis from
Rose, a court should apply the four-factor test set forth in Rose and
Musgrave, which invokes many of the same elements as Justice Breyer’s
six interpretive tools used to assess Establishment Clause issues.259 The
four-factor test focuses on the central purpose behind the law (or in this
case the display): (1) Was the law or display designed to promote a
government message (purpose)?; (2) Who has editorial control of the
message—the government or private entity (the text)?; (3) What is the
See supra notes 209–21.
Everson v Ewing Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (explaining examples of practices
that the Establishment Clause is designed to prohibit).
257
See supra notes 227–28. See also Hein v. Religious Freedom Foundation, 127 S. Ct. 2553,
2568 (2007) (dismissing the argument that the President’s faith-based initiative program
was invalid; although upholding Flast’s narrow exception to taxpayer standing while
refusing to expand it to apply to the issue presented in the litigation). As it stands, Hein
seems to suggest that the Court is not willing to expand Flast’s exception anytime soon. Id.
at 2569. On the other hand, Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate poses a different
issue than the issues raised in the other cases because the “In God We Trust” message on
the state-issued license plates is not as clearly identified with the government. See Olree,
supra note 7, at 213 (noting that a specialized license plate is different than pure
government speech); supra note 140 (discussing Rose and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in Choose Life Ill., Inc. reiterating that messages on license plates can
contain a mixture of government and private speech).
258
See supra Parts III.A–B.
259
See supra Parts III.B, IV.A.
255
256
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identity of the actual speaker—the government or private person (akin to
history, tradition, and precedent)?; (4) Who bears the ultimate
responsibility for the message—again, the government or a private entity
(equating to the consequences of the law or display)?260 As applied to
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate, this four-factor test
demonstrates, as discussed above in Part III, that the plate contains
mixed speech, resulting in citizens paying for the “In God We Trust”
message regardless of whether they agree with it.
V. CONCLUSION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” plates have spawned strong reactions
from supporters and critics alike.261 Indiana’s General Assembly could
have avoided potential Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy
concerns regarding the “In God We Trust” license plate by clearly
categorizing the plate as a specialty plate and charging an administrative
fee to cover the cost of production similar to the fee charged for other
specialty plates.262 Moreover, to further the alleged secular purpose of
the plate, the state could have collected organizational fees and
contributed those fees to a secular organization, much like Tennessee did
when it contributed the money it collected from the sales of its specialty
license plates to the Bald Eagle Foundation.263 Instead, Indiana chose not
to charge any fees because it wanted to avoid potential issues that could
result from the monies going to a religious organization for a plate that is
purportedly secular in purpose and effect. However, in doing so the
Indiana General Assembly may have created more problems then it
likely contemplated.
McCreary suggests that Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates
violate the Establishment Clause because these plates lack the requisite
secular purpose, endorse religion, and may have a coercive effect on
Indiana citizens. Furthermore, the four-factor test set forth by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, when applied to the “In God We Trust” license
plate, leads to the conclusion that the license plate contains mixed
speech, resulting in a First Amendment compelled subsidy violation.
However, the Supreme Court’s expanding definition of government
speech and the continual erosion of the Flast exception may leave
Indiana citizens with less ability to challenge the General Assembly’s
actions because few will be able to demonstrate the personal harm
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required for standing.264 Nevertheless, Indiana’s “In God We Trust”
license plate in its current form is unconstitutional, and the Indiana
General Assembly should charge an extra fee similar to any other
specialty plate that promotes a message. And as license plates
displaying personal messages or other special interests continue to grow
in popularity, future legislatures and reviewing courts should closely
examine the plates, utilizing the interpretative tools and tests described
above because the plates present a real threat.
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